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THROUGH THE GATES OF ASIA. 
IN universal history there is no more interesting subject 
for the consideratioir of t hc  political student than the 
record of Russian progress through Central Asia. 
In one scnsc this advance is a practical reestablishment 
or extension of t l ~ c  influence of the Aryan race in coun- 
tries long dominated by peoplcs of Turlci or Mongolian 
origin; in another sense it has resulted in a transition 
from the barbarism or rude fo1.m~ of Asiatic Iife to the 
enlightenment and higher moral development of a Euro- 
pean age. In a religious sense it embodies a crusade 
against Oriental fanaticism ; and it is a curious feature of 
the Anglo-Russian dispute, that upon a question of tem- 
poral gain, the  greatest Christian nation finds itself allied 
with the followers of Buddha and Mahomet against Russia 
under the  Banner of the Cross. 
I 
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The descendants of the grcat Peter have opened up in 
Central Asia a new regioil whicll, if as yet i t  has not been 
l 1  made to blossom as thc rosc," has nevertheless profited by 
tile introduction of law, order, and a certain amount of 
industrial prosperity. 
Russia cornmenccd her relations with Central Asia as 
early as the sixtecnth century. Not only through embas- 
sies sent, but by military expeditions ; these, however, at 
that time were private ventures by roving Cossacks and 
other inhabitants of Southern Russia. Authorized gov- 
ernment expeditions commenced with Peter the Great, 
who in 1716-17 sent two exploring parties illto the Central 
Asia11 deserts-13eltovitch to  IChiva, and Liltl~areff to the 
Black Irtish. These expeditions were undertalten in search 
of gold, supposed t o  cxist in those regions, but failed in their 
object ; the  detachment under Beltovitch being entirely 
dcstroyed after reaching IChiva. Peter next turncd his 
attention to the countiy bordering upon the southern 
shores of the Caspian Sea ;  taking advantage of Persian 
embarrassments, with thc  consent of the Shah and of the 
Sultan he acquired, in 1722-3, the provinccs of Gilan, 
Mazanderan, and Asterabad; but the great cxpense of 
maintaining a large garrison so remote from Russia, ancl 
the unhealthiness of the  locality, induced thc Russian 
Government, in 1732, to restore the districts to Persia. 
In the same year Abul-Khair, the I<han of the Little 
Kirghiz Horde, voluntarily submitted to Russia. Twenty 
years later a small strip of the kingdom of Djungaria, on 
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the Irtish, was absorbed, and toward the coinmcncement 
of thc reign of Catharine II., Russian authority was as- 
sertecl and maiiltainecl over thc broad tract from the AItai 
to the Caspian. This occupation was limited to a linc of 
outposts along the Ural, thc Irtish, and in thc intervening 
district. During Catharine's reign the frontier ilomads 
became reduced in numbers, by the cleparturc from the 
stcppe between the Ural and Volga of the Calmucl<s, who 
flecl into Djungaria, and were nearly destroyed on the 
road, by the I<irghiz. 
The connection between Russia and Central Asia at 
this time assumed another character, that of complete 
tranquillity, in consequence of the dcvelopinent of trade 
through Orenburg and to  sotne extent through Troitsk 
and Pctropaulovslt. The lines along the Ural and 11-tish 
gradually acquired strength; the robbcr-raids into Euro- 
pean Russia and Western Sibel-ia almost entirely ceasing. 
Thc allegigncc of the Icirghiz of the Little and Central 
Hordes was expressed in the fact that their Ichans were 
always selected undcr Russian influence and from time to 
timc appeared at St. Petersburg to render homage. With 
the Central Asian Ithanates there was no connection ex- 
cept that of trade,but as regarded the Turcomans, who, it 
is said, had frequently aslted for Russian protection, inter- 
course was discouraged, as they could not be trusted 
"within the lines," being simply bandits. 
The Emperor Paul imagined that the steppes offered a 
good road to Southern Asia, and desiring to expel the 
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English from India, in the year I 800 he despatched a large 
numbcr of Don C O S S ~ C ~ ~ S ,  under Orloff, through tllc 
districts of the Littlc I-Iordc. A t  tllc time a treaty was 
concluded with Napoleon, then First Consul, by virtue 
of which a combiilcd Russo-Frcnch army was to  discm. 
bark a t  Astcrabad and march froin thence illto India by 
way of IChorassan a11d Afghanistan. Thc  death of the 
Ernperor of Russia put  an end t o  this plan. 
During the reign of Alexander I., Central Asia was 
suffered to rcst, and even the Chinese made raids into 
Russian territorywithout interruption. In  thc third decade 
of the present century, however, several advanced military 
settlements of Cossacks were founded. "Thus," says M. 
Veniul;off, "was inaugurated the  policy which afterward 
guided us in the stcppe, the foundation of advanced 
settlements and towns (at first forts, afterwards sta7zitsas*) 
until the most advanced of them touches some natural 
barrier." 
About 1840, it was discovered that the  system of 
military colonization was morc effectual in preserving 
order in the Orenburg district than by flying detachments 
sent, as occasion required, f~ om Southcrn Russia ; and 
in 1845-6 thc orenburg and Ural (or Targai and Irgiz) 
forts were established. In 1846 thc  Great ICirghiz 
I-Iorde acknowledged ils subjcctinn t o  Russia on  the 
farthcr side of the Ballcash, tvhilc a t  the  same time a fort 
was constructcd on the lower Yaxartes. 
* Cossaclc settlements. 
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In  1847 the encroachlnents of Russia in Central Asia 
had brought her upolr the borders of the important 
khanates of IChiva and Kholcand, and, like some huge 
,boa-constrictor, she prepared to swallow them. I n  1852 
the inevitable military expedition was followed by the 
customaly perrnallc~lt post. Another row of forts was 
planted on the Lower Yaxartes, and in 1854 far to  the  
eastward, in the midst of the  Great Horde, was built Fort  
Vernoye-the foundation of a new lime, more or less con- 
tiguous t o  natural boundaries (motntains and rivers), but 
not a close line. Between Perovslcy and Vernoye there 
were upwards of four hundred and fifty miles of desert 
open t o  the incursions of brigands, and between t hc  Aral 
and Caspian seas there was a gap, two hundred miles in 
width, favorable for raids into the Orenburg Steppe from 
the side of I<hivn. Finally, under the pretext of closing 
this gap, a general convergent movement of the Siberian 
and Orcnburg forces commenced, culminating under Gen- 
eral Tchernayeff in the capture of Aulieata and Chemlcent 
in 1864, and of Tashkent in 1865. 
Here, M. Veniulcoff says : "The Government intended 
to halt in its conquests, and, limiting itself to  forming 
a closed line oil the south of the Kirghiz steppes, left 
it t o  thc sedentary inhabitants of Tashkent to  form a 
separate khanate from the Kholtand so I~ostile t o  us." 
And this historian tells us that the  Tashkendees declined 
the honor of becoming the Czar's policemen in this way, 
evidently foreseeing t11e end, and, to  cut t he  matter short, 
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chose the Russian general, Tchernayeff, as their Ichan. 
Thc fcw Central Asian rulers whose necks had so far 
escaped the Muscovite heel, made an ineffectual resist- 
ancc, and in 1866 I-Iocljeni and Jizalch wcre duly I 
4 
"aiinexcd," thus separating Bokhara and I<hol\rand. P 
Here we inay glance at the tnethod by which Russia 
took firmer root on the shores of the Caspian, and estab- 
lished a comn~ercial linlc with the IChivan rcgion. In 
1869 a military post and seaport was planted at  Krasno- 
I 
vodsk, on that point Bf thc east shore of the Caspian, 
which presents the greatest facilities for shipping, and as 
a base of operations against the Turcomans, who were at  
I that time very troublesome. Several military expcdi- 
I 
I tions set out from this point, and every year dctachmcnts 
'1 of troops were despatched to keep the roads open toward 
Ichiva, the Icepet Dagh, or the banlrs of the Attrelc. 
Within five years (1870-'7s) the ilomads living within 
the routes named had become "good Turcomans," car- 
ried the Czar's mails to Ichiva, and furnished the Icrasno- 
vodsk-I<hivan caravans with camels and drivers. But t he  
colonizatioil scheme on the lower Caspian had once more 
brought the ~ u s s i a h s  to the Persian boundary. In 1869 the 
Shah had been rather officiouslyassured that Russia urould 
not think of going below the line of the Attrelc ; yet, as 
Colonel Veniulcoff shows, she now regrets having corn- 
mitted herself, and urges " geographical ignorance " of 
the locality wheil the assurance was given, and the fact 
that part of her restless subjects, on the Attrek, pass 
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eight months of the year in Russian territoi-y aild four in 
" so-called " Pelria ; i t  is therefore ~ ~ o t  difficult to imagine 
the probable change on the map of that quarter. 
The march continuecl towarcl Ichiva, and after the  usual 
iron-hand-in-velvet-glove introduction, General I<aufmaizn 
in 1573 pounced upon that important khanate, and thus. 
added anotller to the jewels of the Empire. Nominally, 
Ichiva is indcpcndent, but nevertheless collects ancl pays 
to Russia a consiclerable contribution annually. 
In 1868 Russia seized Sainarcand, a ~ i d  established over 
the lchanate of Bolthara a similar supervision to  t ha t  in 
Ichiva. As  the distinguished Russian alrcady quoted 
remarlcs : " The programme of thc political existence of 
Bolcliara as a separate sovereignty was accorded to her  by 
us in the shape of two treaties, in 1868 and 1873, wliich 
defined her subordinate relation to Russia. But n o  one 
1001~s at these acts as the treaties of an equal with an 
equal. They are instructions in a polite form, or pro- 
grammes given by the  civilized conqueror t o  t h e  con- 
quered barbarians, and the execution of ivhich is guaran- 
teed by the immediate presence of a military force." 
The  district of IChokand, whose ruler, Ichudoyar Khan, 
submitted himself to Russia in 1867, was lor a number of 
years nominally independent, but becoming disturbed by 
domestic dissensions, was uItimatcly annexed uncIer the 
name of the Fergana Province. 
To  this point we have followed Colonel Veniukoff's ac- 
count of the Russian advance. I t  will doubtless interest 
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the  reader to continue the narrative from an English 
view, exceptionally accurate and dispassionate in its 
naturc. 
I n  a lecture before the Royal United Service Institu- 
tion in London, May IG, 1884, Lieut.-General Sir Edward 
Hamley, of the British Army, discussed the Central Asia11 
question before an audience comprising such India11 
experts as Sir Ilenry Rawlinson, Lord Napier of Mag- 
dala, and Mr. Charles Marvin, and many distinguished 
. 
officers, iilcludi~lg Lord Chelmsforcl, Sir F. I-Iaines, and 
Colonel Malleson. Among other things, General Hamley 
said : dc 
"Probably England has never been quite free, during 
the present century, from some degree of anxiety caused su 
by the steady, gradual approaches of Russia through ta 
Central Asia, toward India. I t  was seen that where her T 
foot was planted i t  never went back. I t  was seen that a6 
with forces comparatively small she never failed t o  effect tv 
any conquest she was bent 011, and that the conquest, tl. 
once effected, was final. This security in possession was ct 
owing in grcat measure t o  the fact tha t  the governments A 
she displaced were bad governn~ents, and that  she substi- is 
tuted one far better in itself and of a simplicity which was 
well adapted to the people with whom she was dealing. o 
She aimed mainly a t  three things-the establisllment of n 
order and of confidence and the  obtaining of some rcturn s 
for her own heavy expenses. From the  establishment of 
order and of confidellce sprang a prosperity which en- L 
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abled her t o  obtain a certain revenue, though entirely 
inadequate to her expenditure. Thus we bcheld her 
pressing solidly on, and we knew not where she might 
stop. Prctexts, such as it was difficult t o  find a flaw in, 
were never wanting on yhich to ground a fresh absorption 
of territory. And seeing behind this advance a vast 
country-almost a continent-which was not merely a 
great Asiatic Power, but a great European Statc, under 
autocratic, irrcspoi~sible rule, wit11 interests toucl~illg ours 
at many points, it is not t o  be wondered at  that we 
watched with anxiety her progress as she bore steadily 
down toward our Indian frontier." 
General Hamlcy says that England became particularly 
suspicious of Russia in I 867 wheil she absorbed Tsrkcs- 
tan, and this feeling mas intensified in 1878, while the 
Treaty of Berlin was still pending. Gcneral Icaufmann 
assembled a small army of about rz,ooo men and thirty- 
two guns on the frontier of Bokhara, and although upon 
the signing of the treaty all threatening movements 
ceased, yet the British commander then operating in 
Afghanistan kncw that Kaufmann had proposed to marc11 
in the direction of Kabul, and menace the British frontier. 
I t  has ever beell the practice of Russia, in her schemes 
of aggrandizement, to  combine her diploinatic with her 
military machinery ; but, unlike other nations, the ambas- 
sador has generally been subordinate to the general. 
A t  the time that General Kaufmann sheathed his sword 
under the influence of the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878, there 
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remained another representative of Russia-General 
Stolietoff-who had been quietly negotiating with the 
Ameer of Afghailistan, Shere Ali, the terms of a " Russian 
treaty," whose characteristics have already been described. 
I-Iearing of this, the English Ambassador at St. Peters. 
burg questioned the Russian Minister, who answered hiin 
"that no mission had been, nor was intended to be, 
sent to Kabul, eitllcr by the linperial Governineilt or 
by General I<aufinann." This denial was given on July 
3d, the day after Stolietoff and his mission had started 
froin Samarcand. After the envoy's arrival a t  Kabul, 
another remonstrance met with thc reply that thc mission 
was " of a professional nature and one of simple courtesy," 
and was not, therefore, illconsistent with the pacific assur- 
ances already given. The  real nature of this mission be- 
came kilowil from papers foulld by General Roberts at 
Kabul in 1879. These showed that Shere Ali had beell 
invited to form a close alliance with the Russian Govcrn- 
ment. General I<aufmann had advisecl Shcre Ali to try 
and stir up disaffection among the Queen's Indian sub- 
jects, promising to aicl him, eventually, with troops. Find- 
ing that this scheme was impracticable a t  the moment, 
Russia dropped the Ameer, who fled from the scene of his 
misfortunes, and died soon after. 
For the moment England breathed more frccly. There 
were still great natural obstacles between the empires of 
Russia and of India. Not only the friendly state of Af- 
ghanistan, but on its northwestern border the neutral 
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territory of Merv, hitherto an independent province, and 
inllabitcd by warlike tribes of Turcotnans difficult t o  reach 
through their deserts and likely to harass a Russiail 
advance to Herat to an embarrassing cxtcnt. I t  was seen 
that the possession of this territory would at once free 
Russia from much difficulty in case of an advance and 
give her the means of threatening I-Ierat as well as Kabul 
from her base in Turltestan, and evcn to some extent t o  
carry forward that base beyond the Oxus. 
On the part of Russia, the success of General Skobeleff 
in capturing thc fortified position of Geok TCpC, January 
24, 1880, marlted thc beginning of negotiations with the 
Turcolnans for tlle acquisition of Merv. For a long while 
these were unsuccessful, but early in 1884 i t  was cabled 
to Lonclon, that "The Queen of the World " had accepted 
the White Czar as her future liege lord. 
The immediate cause of this event was the effcct pro- 
duced upon the minds of the Turcoman deputation to  
Moscow by the spectacle of the Czar's coronation. The 
impression created by the gorgeous ceremonial was 
heightened by the presence of so many Asiatic chiefs and 
kinglets at the ancient and historic capital of Russia. The  
tales they brought back were well calculated to influence 
the minds of a wild and primitive people ; and when the 
Khan of IChiva proffered his services for the settlement of 
their rclations with Russia, that scction of the Teltke tribe 
in favor of peate accepted them. The chiefs tendered 
their formal submission to the Czar, and promised to  
allow Russian merchants to reside among them, and 
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pledged themselves to maintain the security of the 
routes from the Oxus to the Tcjend ; also accepting the 
responsibilities of Russian subjects by rendering tribute 
either in money or by military service. To  all intents and 
purposes it is equivalent to  the establisllmcnt of a Russian 
garrison in Merv. 
Tlle thorough way in w l ~ i c l ~  Russia seeks to bind her 
Asiatic subjects is sllown in the fact that in 1884, at the 
rcqucst of the I<han of I<l~iva, a Russian tutor was selected 
to instruct his children. 
Soon after it was reported that the Russians had 
established themselves a t  Saraklls on the direct road to 
1 I EIerat and just ovcr the Persian boundary of Afghanistan. 
These later movements again aroused the distrust of I 
England, and a joint commission of Russian and English 
officials was appointed early in the year I 885. I 
I 
While the English inembers of the commission under 
1 1  / Sir Peter Lutnsdcn were awaiting the convenience of their 
foreign colleagues, the presence of Russian troops was 
reported on the disputed territory in the vicinity of I-Ierat. 1 I i This action alarmed the Afghans, and a collision seemed 
, 
imminent. The  English Government considered M. de , 
Giers' explanation of this encroacl~mcnt unsatisfactory. 
I I Pending an adjustment of the new complication both 
nations prepared for the worst. 
Here we will leavc the subject of the Russian advance 
through the Gates of Asia and pass to the consideration 
of the present neutral ground of Afghanistan. 

ON THE THRESI-IOLD OF INDIA. 
F r o m  the  Amu Daria and the Turcornail steppcs to  tile 
descrts of Bcloochistan, f?om Persian I<horassan to  the 
valley of the Indus, stretches thc coulltry of thc Afghans. 
Men of renown and evcnts of world-wide interest have 
been conncctcd with its history. I t s  records tell of the 
murder of Cavagnari in recent tiincs; of the tragedy of 
Elphinstone's colnlnand (1838-42); of Shah Nadir, the 
butcher  of Delhi (1738-39) ; of Baber Ichali, the founder 
of Mongolian rule in India (1520); of Timul-, the assailer 
, 
of the  world (1398) ; of Genghiz Khan, the a~lllihilator of 
t h e  civilization of ancient Asia (1218-24); of the great 
ruler, Sultan Mahmoud (A. D. 1000) ; and yet earlier, of 
Alexander, " the divincly favored Maceclonian." Afghan 
history dies away, in thc hymns of the Iildiail Vedas, eigh- 
teen  hundred years before the  birth of Christ. 
T h e  territory of Afghanistan--which is dcstined to be 
t h e  arena of a great international duel-covers an area of 
12,000 square milcs, or a tract measuring from north to  
south  688 miles, and from east to west 736 milcs. I t  is a 
mou i~ ta i i~ous  country ; a high plateau, 6,000 fcct above 
t h e  sea, ovcrloolted by lofty inountain rai~ges which open 
o u t  and sink toward the west and soutl~.  On the north 
I 3  
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it is bordered by thc western ranges of the Himalayas, t vall 
which reach to thc Amu Daria; by the wall-lilte range of E ~ 0 ,  ! 
the Hindu I c ~ s h ,  some of whosc peaks are rg,ooo feet t upc 
high ; and by several sinallcr ridges. Betwcen the Icabul ? and 
and Icuram rivers rises the snow-capped Sufeid Icoh, the and 
I principal peak of which, to  the south of Jelalabad, attains 1 the 
an altitude of 15,000 fcet. TO the south of this, in South- 1 
ern Afghanistan, t11c Suleiman range, of an average height Gii 
of 9,000 feet, falls rapidly toward thc valley of the  Indus. ant 
f Between the Hindu I tash and the Suleiman ranges there H c 
are several lesser oncs stretching toward the southwest, Fa. 
including the Auran Mountains (7,000 feet). a1 s 
Of the principal rivers noted here (the Helmund, I-Iar- JO 
i-Rrfd, Kabul, Icuram, and the Gomal) the Ilelmund riv 
alone is navigable. The  Helmund terminates in the so 
swamps of Seistan, as also do the  Kas11, Farrah, and I<( 
Herat rivers, running parallel to the I-Ielmund across the ro 
Icandahar-Hcrat roads, a t  80, I 50, and zoo miles, respec- 
tively, to the west of it. These rivers are without bridges, el 
but (with the exception of the Helmund-provided wit11 st 
ferry at Girishk) are fordable, save in the months of April of 
and May. The  country is othcrwisc open and easily n 1 
traversable, but only on the main routes can water be 
readily obtained, and forage is scarce in the minter. 
The  Turnulc valley, running northeast from Icandallar, tl 
is followed by the great route to Ghazni and Kabul skirting n 
the Guilcok range-separated from the Hazaristan to its 
west by the parallel valley of the Argandab. T h e  latter 
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valley is also followcd by a routc which enters it from 
Mooldur, the source of tlle Turnuk. This debouches 
upon the Ilerat road abqut ten iniles west of ICandahar, 
and there is no coinmunicatioil west of it bctwccn Herat 
ancl Kabul, save by impracticable mountain routes across 
the I-Iazaristan. 
Threc routes from ICandahar t o  Herat separate a t  
Girishkon the Helmund, cross the ICash at diffcrcnt points, 
and meet a t  Sabzawar (280 rniles from ICai~dahar) 011 the  
Herat ; both of the soutl~crnmost passing by thc town of 
Farrali, which is 230 miles from ICandal~ar. From Girishk 
also a road follows the Helmund to Seistail and Lasb 
Jowain, where it joins the I-Ierat road at  Farrah on  the 
river of that nainc, or at Sabzawar on the Herat. T l ~ e  
southernmost of the routcs to  Farrah also brancl~es from 
ICash down the river named Rash, joining the Seistan 
route a t  Lash. 
The  general aspect of Afghanistan is that  of a series of 
elevated flat-bottomed valleys, in the vicinity of the  
streams, sorncwhat under cultivation. T h e  scenciy is 
often wild and beautiful, and soine of the defiles t o  the 
north of the Iliildu Itash are said to bc of appalling 
grandcur, while the soft, still loveliness of the sheltered 
glcns on the southern slope of that range strongly impresses 
the traveller who visits them. Soine of the ranges in the 
north and northeast are well tiinbered with pine and oak. 
The  eastern half of Afghanistan is generally cold and 
rugged, but sustains innumerable floclcs and herds, and 
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abounds in mineral wealth, especially lead and sulphur. 
I n  the more sheltered valleys considerable fruit is grown, 
but only grain enough for the actual consumption of the 
inhabitants. Water and fodder abound, but 'fuel is de6- 
cient ; a serious matter, as the cold in the winter is extreme. 
The western part of Afghanistan is a more fertile region, 
interspersed, it is truc, with lofty rangcs, but comprising 
many pleasant valleys and pastures. 
The population is approximately estimated at  eight 
millions. Afghanistan is a genuine society of different 
nations, although the greater part are of Persian descent. 
Tlle strongholds of the German self-protecting federa- 
tions ai-c here produccd on a large scale. 
Thus the Duranis, Tajilcs, Yusafzais, Ghilzais, Eim$~lcs, 
Hazaris, [(affirs, I-Iindus, Jats, Arabs, I<izilbashis, Uzbclcs, 
Biluchis, are near neighbors; of thesc about 3,000,000 
may be real Alghans who profess the Suni faith and spcalc 
Inclo-Persian Puclitu. There are over four hundred 
inferior tribes ltnown. The Duranis are numerically 
strongest and live in the vicinity of I<andahar. Next in 
importance are the Ghilzais, estimated at  30,000 fighting 
men living in the triangle-Kabul, Jelalabad, Iihelat-i- 
Ghilzai ; until 1747 they furnished the rulers of Afghan- 
istan. T o  the south of the Gbilzais live the Puchtu- 
speaking races who chiefly defend only their own territory; 
the mou~ltainous eastern border is inhabited by thc 
Momunds, Afridis, Aralczais, Zymukts, Waziris, who have 
never been subdued. Their sense of independence, how- 
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ever, does not prevent them from selling their frieildship 1 
for ready inoney to the highest bidder. On the water- 
k 
of the Helmund and Indus dwell the independent ' 
Pathails and Biluchis. The Persian-spcalring I<izilbashis 
in Icabul, comprise 3,000,000 of Shiahs, who are ilot 
Afghans, many of whose 30,000 fighting men are in the 
Ameer's regular army. The Tajilcs-about IO,OOO men 
-are chiefly in the Kabul and Ghazni districts. The 
Hazaris and EimAks are in the central section of Afghan- 
istan, ltnown as the Hazaristan, cxtending east and west 
from the I<oushan pass over the Hindu-ICtish range to 
Marchat on the Turcoman frontier, and north and south 
from Sirpool in Turltestan to Girishk, between ICandal~ar 
and Herat ;  they are the descendants of the military 
settlers left by the Tartar hordes that swept Central 
Asia under' Geilghiz Khan, and still maintain a quasi- 
) L 
independence ; they cordially detest the Afghan Govern- I- 
ment, but pay an annual tribute in money to its support. 
Finally there is a million of foreign nationalities, including 
Turks, Persians, Indians, Armenians, and Icaffirs ; the last- 
named are I-Iindus, and violent antagonists of the Moham- 
medans living around them. 
Thus it is seen that modern Afghanistan comprises 
three great districts-Herat in the west, Kabul in the 
east, and Icandahar in the centre, with the seat of gov- 
ernment at  the cities of the same names respectively. 
Within each district are, as already described, a large 
number of tribes occupyiilg sub-districts, closely connected ' 
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like the cells of a honey-comb, but each with its destine., 
tive manners and customs and irregular military forces, in 
no instance numbering lcss than 6,000 men, and often 
twice that number, divided about equally into horse and 
foot. Many of these render militaiy scrvicc to t l ~ e  Amcer, 
many are bandits in the worst sense. The notnadic 
tribes-like the EimAlts peopling the Heratic region-live 
principally in tents, encamping in winter in thc valleys, 
and in suinmer on the,table-lands of the mountain ranges. 
They are ignorant, hospitable, and brave and ardent 
hunters. Their principal trade is with Herat, and con- 
h 
sists of woollen and camel-hair fabrics and clarified 
butter. 
The farming population all live in small hamlets. The 
better classes of these live in villages surrounding or joined 
to the castle of a Khan. Thcse castles are encompassed 
by a rude wall, having frequently turrets at  the corners, 
and occasionally armed with swivel-guns or wall-pieces. 
The principal gardens are always on the outsidc of the 
castle, and the herds of horses and camels belonging to 
the Khan are kept at  distant pastures and attended by 
herders, who live in tents. In the Bori and Ghazgar val- 
leys the houscs are of wood. In the Ghazgar valley they 
are all fortified, as already described ; the doors are gen- 
erally mere man-holes, and the top of the towers are loop- 
holes. The better class, and more modern of these, have 
flat roofs, from which the water is carried by spouts; the 
walls surrounding are at least twelve feet high, and cover 
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nearly an acre of ground. Three or four such houses 
usually constitute a village. These semi-barbarians are 
noted for the length and ferocity of their feuds. Sometimes Easter 
two branches of a family w11o are neighbors become enemies. by the 
The distance between their " fortlets " may be two hun- sion. 
dred ~ a r d s ,  and on that space no one ventures. They go 
out at opposite gates and wallc straight from their own 
fort in a line protected by its walls from thc fire of the their 
othcr, until out of range, then they turn around to their betwe 
fields. Broadfoot relates that " once in Zarmat I saw a town 1 
fort shut by rolling a stone against the door, instead of with they li 
the usual heavy chain. On inquiring as to the cause of onsla 
such carelessness, the Malik, a fine old man with a plump, 
good-humored face, stretched his arms out toward the 
line of distant forts, ancl said: ' I have not an enemy! ' 
I t  was a pleasing exception to the rule." 
These feuds are a system of pctty warfare, carried on 
by long shots, stealing cattle, and burning crops. Samson, 
burning his neighbor's corn, acted just like an Afghan. 
When the harvest is nearly ripe, neither party dare sleep. 
The  remedy is sometimes for both to  fight until an equal 
number are killed on each side, when the neighbors step 
in and effect a reconciliation ; another method is to pay 
forfeit of a feast and some shcep or cloth ; in exceptional 
cases, a few Afghan virgins are substitutcd for the sheep, 
but they are given in marriage, and are well treated. 
Our space does not permit an extended reference to 
the manners and customs of this primitive people but a 
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few characteristics may be briefly noted. T h e  love of 
war is felt much more among Afghans than by other 
Eastern peoples, although but little effort has been made 
by them to augment t h e  means of resistance and aggres- 
sion. Pillage, fighting, and disturbances are a t  times 
necessary to their very existence, and are followed by long 
days of idleness, during which they live on the fruits of 
their depredations. There is no shade of difference 
between the character of the nomad and the  citizen; a 
town life does not soften their habits; they live there as 
they live in a tent, armed to the teeth and ready for the 
onslaught. Though full of duplicity, one is nevertheless 
liable to be talcen in by their apparent frankness. They 
are hospitable to strangers, but  only bccause this is an 
ancient custom which has the  force of law and is not a 
virtue which springs from the  heart. The  pride of the 
Afghans is a marked feature of their national character, 
They boast of their descent, their prowess in arms, their 
independence; and cap all by "An1 I not a Puktan?" 
The Afghan people, occupied with the defence of their 
homes, have failed t o  assist the Ameer in the  formation 
and maintenance of tha t  indispensable instrument-an , 
organized, well-equipped, easily mobilized army. In  reg- 
ular battle the Afghans can have but little hope of suc- 
cess ; their strength lies in the petty warfare peculiar to a ' 
wild, mountainous country. As auxiliaries, as partisan 
troops in their own country, they would be of great value 
to their allies and extremely troublesome to  their enemies. 
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For outpost, courier, and scouting purposes, they would 
doubtless be most efficient. The strength of the organ- 
ized army in the service of the Ameer of Afghanistan is 
about 50,000 men of all arms. The  traveller VdmbCry, 
who visited Herat in 1863, says : 
"The  Afghan's national costume consists of a long 
shirt, drawers, and dirty linen clothes ; or, if he is a sol- 
dier, he affects a British red coat. H e  throws it  over his 
shirt, while he gets on his head the picturesque Indo- 
Afghan turban. Others again-and these are the drazr- 
monde-are wont to assume a half-Persian costume. Weap- 
ons are borne by all. Rarely does any one, whether civil 
or military, enter the bazar without his sword and shield. 
T o  be quite h In ?fzode one must carry about one quite an 
arsenal, consisting of two pistols, a sword, poniard, hand- 
jar, gun, and shield." M. VAmbCry also describes a drill 
of some Afghan regulars. 
" The men had a very military bearing, far better than 
the Ottoman army that was so drilled forty years ago. 
These might have been mistalcen for European troops if 
most of them had not had on their bare feet the pointed 
Icabuli shoe, and had not had their short trowsers so 
tightly stretched by their straps that they threatened 
every moment to  burst and fly up above the knee." 
The adventurous O'Donovan thus describes an Afghan 
cavalrymail whom he met unexpectedly, near Herat, in 
1880: " He wore a dark-colored turban, one end of the 
cloth pulled up in front so as t o  resemble a small cockade. 
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His uniform was blue-black, and he wore long boots. fl 
broad blaclc leather cross-belt, with two very large brass 
bucl~les, crosscd his breast. H e  had sabre, pistols, and 
carbine." 
I The actual fighting strength of the army of Afghanistan 
cannot be definitely stated. Major Lumsden, who has rep- 
resented the British Government in that country in various 
diplomatic capacities, stated (some years since) that the 
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regular army of the Arneer consisted of sixteen regiments 
of infantry, three of cavalry, and seventy-six field guns. 
The infantly regiments numbered about 800 Inen each; 
the men were obtained by compulsory levy. Their uni- 
form consisted of English cast-off clothes purchased at 
auction. The  pay, about five rupees per mensem, was 
paid irregularly and often in kind ; two months' pay was 
deducted for clothing. The  cavalry and artillery were 
badly l~orsed;  and the horses were sent to  graze in 
summer. A Russian report of 1868 estimates the infantry 
at ~o ,ooo  men. The armament, equipment, and instruc- 
tion of the troops' have doubtless improved since that 
time, as ten years later the British Government supplied 
the Afghan Government with ~o ,ooo Enfield and 5,000 
Snider rifles and one field battery, and very recently 
(1555) it was announced that a present of Martini-Henry 
rifles and improved field guns had been sent to  Abdurrall- 
man by  the Indian authorities. 
~ e s i d e s  the regular army there is a paid irregular 
mounted force of about 20,000 men, active and forinidab1.e 
in '' hill operations," and lcnown as Jezailcl~is. 
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The  late Gcncral Colin Maclrenzic, in an account of his 
expcriences in the Elphinstone disaster of 1842, says : 
"Thc Jczailchis are so called from their jezails or long 
rifles. The  Afghans are said to  be among the bcst marks- 
men in the world. They are accustomed to arms from 
early boyhood, live in a chronic state of warfare with 
their neighbors, and are most skillul in talring advantage of 
covcr. A n  Afghan will throw himself flat, behind a stone 
barely big enough to covcr his head, and scoop a hollow 
in the ground with his left clbow as he loads. Mcn lilre 
these only require training to lnalre first-rate irregular 
troops. 
"As a trait of Afghan character, I must mention that 
whenever the Jezailchis could snatch five minutes to 
refrcsh tl~emsclves with a pipe, one of them would twang 
a sort of a rude guitar as an accompanime~lt to soine 
martial song, which, mingling with the notes of war, 
sounded very strangely." 
T h e  Russian General Staff have also estimated the 
Ameer's force, exclusive of the  irregulars, a t  66,400 men 
with 30 guns. 
T h e  efficiency of this body, by reason of their peculiar 
surroundings, must vaiy with the character of the  opera- 
tions. For  defence-particularly of their own section- 
they form an important consideration ; for aggressive pur- 
poses their strength lies in partisan operations, in small 
detachments, requiring great mobility. 
Just as it is difficult t o  understand the rapidity with 
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which large numbers are assembled in Afghanistan for 
fighting purposes, so the dispersing of an Afghan army 
together with its attendant masses of tribal levies in flight 
is almost beyond comprehension; men who have beell 
actually engaged in hand-to-hand combat dispose of their 
arms in the villages they pass through, and meet their 
pursuers with melons or other fruit in their hands, while 
they adopt the rble of peaceful inhabitants. 
A brief description of some of the more noted cities of 
Afghanistan may be appropriate here. 
Sir Henry Rawlinson gives the following details respect- 
ing the so-called Key of India-the city of Herat: 
a That which distinguishes Herat from all other Ori- 
ental cities, and at the same time constitutes its main de- 
fence, is the stupelldous character of the earthwork upon 
which thc city wall is built. This earthwork averages 
250 fcet in width at  the base and about 5 0  feet in height, 
and as it is crowned by a wall 25 feet high and 14 feet 
thick at the base, supported by about I50 semicircular 
towers, and is further protected by a ditch 45 feet in 
width and 16 feet in depth, it presents an appearance of 
imposing strength. Whether the place is really as strong 
as it loolts has been differerltly estimated. General Fer- 
rier, who resided for some time in Herat, in 1846, states 
that the city is nothing more than an immense redoubt, 
and gives i t  as his opinion that, as the line of wall is en- 
tirely without flanltiilg defences, the place could not hold 
out for twenty days against a European army;  and M. 
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Khaniltoff, who, although not a professional soldier, was a 
very acute observer, further rcmarlts that the whole in-. 
terior of the city is dominated from the rising ground 700 
yards distant and covered with solid buildings at the north- 
east angle, while the water supply both for the ditch and 
the city would be at the mercy of an enemy holding the 
outside country; the wells and reservoirs inside the wall, 
which could then alone be available-being quite inade- 
quate t o  the wants of the inhabitants: but on the other 
hand, all experience testifies to the defensibility of the 
position. 
" Not t o  speak of the siege which Herat sustained af the 
hands OF Genghiz Khan, of Timur, and of Ahmed Shah, 
we have only to remember that in 1837 the Afghans of 
Herat, under Major Eldred Pottinger, beat off the con- 
tinuous attacks, for nearly ten months, of a Persian army 
of 35,000 regular troops supported by fifty pieces of artil- 
lery, and in many cases directed and even commailded by  
Russian officers. The  truth seems to be that Herat, al- 
thougli in its present state quite unfit to  resist a European 
army, possesses great capabilities of defence, and might 
by a skilful adaptation of the resources of modern science 
be made almost impregnable. Major Saunders, a British 
engineer officcr, calculated in 1840 that, at an outlay of 
£60,000, which would iilclude the expenses of deepening 
the ditch, clearing the glacis and esplanade, providing 
flanking defences, and repairing the walls througl~out, 
I-Ierat might be rendered secure against any possible re- 
newal of the attack by Persia." 
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i The location of this city upon the principal thoroug11- 1 i ler 
fare between India, Persia, and Turkestan gives it a spe- 1 cal 
j cia1 importance in a military sense. I t  is also the tin 
I 
principal mart of Western Afghanistan, and comprises 8 nu 
extensive manufactures in wool and leather. The natural ! rll 
fertility of the couiltry near Herat has been enhanced 
by irrigation. 
"The valley, orjzl&nh (as the Persians say), in which the 
city lies is rich in the possession of a river. This valley is 
about thirty miles long by sixteen in breadth, exclusive 
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of the ground taken up by the fortress and the walls. C ba 
Four, of these miles separate the town from the northern 
and twelve from the southern hills, while a t  one quarter 
of the greater distance runs the Her-i-Rhd or I-Ierat River, 
which, rising near the Kuh-i-Baba, pursues a westerly 
course till, passing the city, it sweeps, first gradually, then 
decidedly, to  the north, eventually to  lose its identity in 
the environs of Sarakhs. I t  is of political as well as of 
geographical importance, for it passes between the Per- 
sian and Afghan frontier posts of Kallriz and Khs6n 
respectively, and may be considered to  mark the Perso- 
Afghan boundary at the Western Paropismus. The Plain, 
south of the walls, is watered by a net-work of eight or 
nine large and many minor ditches. The  aqueducts are 
stated to  be superior to those of Bokl~ara, Samarcand, and 
Ispallan. The grain produced is abundant-beyond the 
requirements of town and suburbs together. The  bread, 
the water, and the vines have the merit of special excel- 
b 
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lence. Yet, with all this wealth of means and material, 
capable of subsisting an army of 150,ooo men for some 
time, much of the legacy of past ages is disregarded and 
nullified by the supineness of a present generation. The 
ruins visible on all sides are not all useless or obsolete 
works. A s  one conclusive instance may be cited the 
neglected ' PLil-i-Malan.' This bridge, of twenty-three 
arches, can scarcely be considered void of purpose or prac- 
tical benefit. I t  is, however, rapidly falling into decay, 
and as the river has changed its bed, part of it remains, 
barren of object, on dry land. On the rising of thc waters 
this state of things is inconvenient ; for the river, a t  such 
time, is no longer fordable, and the Kandahar caravans, 
going to and fro, have difficulty in crossing." * 
In 1830 Conolly was of opinion that the city was one 
of the dirtiest in the world, being absoIutely destitute of 
drainage ; and VAmbery, thirty-three years afterward, 
when the city was captured by Dost Mohammed, says 
the  city was largely a heap of rubbish, having suffered 
the horrors of a long siege. 
The city of Kabul, from which the surrounding territory 
of Eastern Afghanistan takes its name, stands in lat. 34" 
30' N., and long. 69" 6' E., near the point where the Kabul 
River is crossed by three bridges. I ts  altitude is 6,400 
feet, and, within a short distance to the north, is over- 
topped by pinnacles of the Hindu Kash about 14,ooo feet 
higher. 
*Sir F. J. Goldsmid, " Journeys Between Herat and IChiva." 
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The winters arc severe, but the summers are very tern- 
perate-scld~m going above 80'. Icabul is fortified with- 
out and within ; being separated into quarters by stone 
walls: the Bala Hissar, or citadcl propel; bcing on the 
east, while the Persian quarter 01 the city is strongly 
protected on the southwest. In  the days of Sultan 
Baber, Kabul was the capital of the Mogul empire. In 
modern times, it has been the scenc of many Anglo- 
Indian struggles. I t  was taken by the British in 1839, 
and lost by them, through treachciy, in 1841 ; in the 
1 following January, 4,000 British soldiers and 12,000 camp- 
followers were massacrkd while retreating. 
ICandahar, t l ~ c  apital of Central Afghanistan, is about 
two hundred miles S. W. of ICabul, and thrce hundred and 
seventy-one miles E. of Herat. I t  is said to  have been 
founded by Alexander of Macedon. T h e  city is laid out 
at right angles, and is watered from the neighboring rivers 
through canals, which send to every street an ample sup- 
ply. Sir Michael Biddulph describes the surroundings: 
" I<andahar stands on the western side of a plain, which 
was origiilally a barren slcirt of the mountain. Exactly 
opposite to  the city, and two miles to  t he  westward, there 
is a wide break in the dividing ridge, through which the 
road to I-Ierat leads, and by wliich are conducted the 
many canals and watercourses, talcen from the Argandab, 
to supply the town and fertilize its environs. The  energy 
and skill displayed in these extensive water-worlts cannot 
be too highly extolled. Brought from a point many miles 
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distant in the Argaildab valley, the  chief canal, with its 
offsl~oots, conducts a vast body of water, which is dis- 
persed along thc contours of the declining plain in  
innumerable channels, spreading a rich fertility for inany 
miles in a fan-like form to the southeast of the  gap. 
Villages clustcr around the  city on three sides ; ~ 0 ~ 1 1 -  
fields, orchards, gardens, and vineyards are seen in 
luxurious succession, presenting a vcritable oasis w i t h i n  
the  girdle of rugged hills and desert wastes all a round.  
And if we turn to the  aspect of the country beyond the 
gap, wc  see in the Argandab valley, along the  canals and 
the  river banlts, a fair and beautiful landscape of v i l lage  
and cultivated ground, stretching for many miles in e a c h  
direction. This productive character of the immedia t e  
neighborhood of Kandahar, and its commanding p o s i t i o i ~  
within rcach of other fertile districts, would give to this 
place, under a strong, stable, and just government, as 
mucll prosperity and happiness as falls to t he  lot of any 
place in the world." 
Jelalabad stands on the Kabul River, about half-way bc- 
tween Kabul and the IChaiber Pass. I t  was the scene of the 
stubborn defence by Sir Robert Sale in 1842, referred t o  
elsewhere. I t  has a floating population of about t h r e e  
thousand souls. Our engraving is taken from the south and 
west. Tlze stream in  thc  wcst is the  Kabul River. The  Ja t i  
gate in t5e south wall is the exit from the E-Iindu quar ter .  
Thc  Kabul exit is on the west, while the  road to Peshawur  
commences a t  the gate of that name on the east wall of 
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the city. The   norther^^ gate is Itno~vn as the Phecl Khana, 
or elephant quarter. The  walls of the town and of its 
houses are of mud, and the  roofs gencrally of wood. 
The  city is laid out in the form of a parallclogram inter- 
sected by two main streets crossing in the centre. 
The  town of Ghazni (the ancient Ghizni) is another 
historical landmarlr in a region famous for its evidences of 
former grandeur. I t  stands about 230 miles northeast of 
I<andahar on the road to  Kabul ; it is literally " founded 
upon a rock " a t  an  elevation of 7,726 feet, and its base is 
280 feet above the adjacent plain. I t  has svalls thirty-five 
feet high, and a wet ditch, but is not considered in any 
sense formidable by modcrn engineers, as it is commanded 
by neighboring heights; it will always be a rendezvous 
for the natives, and forms a station or an important line 
of com~nunicatioll betweell the Indus and the Murghab. 
In  the tenth century it  was the seat of an empire com- 
prising the present territory of Afghanistan, and which 
had in the space of sevellty years absorbed thirty-eight 
degrees of longitude and twenty degrees of latitude. I t s  
decline dates from the twelfth centuly, when the seat of 
government was transferred t o  Lahore. From 1839 t o  
1880 i t  bas been occupied alternately by the British and 
w 
the Afghans. T h e  climate is not exceptionally severe, 
although in winter the mercury drops to 25" below zero 
a t  times. T h e  population averages about ten thousand. 
Peshawur is one of the most important towns, both in 
a military and commercial sense, in the Dcrjnt. I t  is 
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the capital of a province of the same name on the N. \V. 
frontier of India, eighteen miles from the Ichaiber Pass and  
one hundred and fifty miles S. E. of Icabul. I t  has  t h e  
usual bastioned dcfenccs, besides some detached works of 
more importance. I t  was ohce a rich and populous city, i 
but has, like Inally other like places in that region, fallen 
from its high estate. I t  is garrisoned by tlle British, and 
can boast of fair trade and a populatioii of about fifty 
thousand. I t  is the centre of a fruitful district containitlg 1 
more than onc inillion inhabitants. 
The  fruitful valley and pass of Bamian lie on the road 
leading from Kabul to Turltestan. The pass, a t  an elevation 
of 8,496 fcet, is the only known defile over the Hindu  
Kash practicable for artillery. This valley was one of t h e  
chief centres of Buddhist worship, as gigantic idols, muti- 
lated indeed by fanatical Mussulmans, conclusively prove. 
Bamian, with its colossal statues cut out in the  rock, was 
among the wonders described by the Buddhist monks w h o  
traversed Central Asia in the fourth century. The statues 
are found on a hill about three hundred feet high, in which 
are a number of cells excavated in the roclr, not unlike 
those found in the Zuni country in the westcrn part of t h e  
United States. The male figure is about 160 ieet, t he  fe- 
male 120 fcet, in height ; they are clothed in light drapery, 
and a winding stair may be ascended to the head. 
Eight miles eastward of Bamian lies the ancient fortress 
, of Zohak, attributed to the  fabulous Pel-sian serpent-king of 
tha t  name. I t  is still used as one of the dcfences of the  pass. 
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The of Afghanistan adapted to lnilitary trans- 
port purposes arc the camel, the ynhzi (mountain pony), 
and the donlcey. 
From certain professional papers, 011 thc camel, by Cap. 
tain Yaldwyn and other oficcrs of the Indian Army, we 
learn that this beast of burden has been oftcn utilized by 
the British in Afghanistan, and the supply of camels 
raised in that country has generally been augmented by 
drafts from India, although the last mentioned do not 
thrive uncler thc transition. The camel is docile, capable 
of abstinence in an emcrgency, well adapted for the im. 
position of loads and for traversing over flat or sandy 
adapts itself to rough roads, has acute sight and 
smell, and, during progression, moves both fcet on one 
side, simultaneo~~sly. Its flcsh and milk arc ~v11oIesome 
articles of food. I t  is deficient in ~nuscularpower behind, 
and cannot readily climb hills, Those'found in Afghan- 
istan are of the Arabian species. They arc strong, thick- 
set, with abundance of bair ; are short in the leg, better 
climbers, and more accustomed t o  cold tban others of the 
species. Their feeding requires as much care as that of 
cavalry or artillery horses; they are fond of green food, 
and certain trees and shrubs. In grazing, camels brought 
from India sometimes are poisoiled by eating the oleander 
bush and other plants which the native camel avoids. 
Elphinstone's ill-fated cxpedition in 1841 lost 800 out of 
2,500 camels from this cause alone. On the march, or 
wl~cre grazing does not abound, thcy are fed with grain 
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and 6h0osn-~; this is given them in one ration at t he  end of 
the  day. The theory that camcls do  not require niuch 
watering is declared a fallacy; tlie Arabian species can 
talre in five or six gallons, sufficient for as many days ; 
they will not clrinlc cold running water; but, where water 
can be had, they s11ouId be watered daily. Tlle load of 
the camel varies from 300 to  450 pounds, depending 
upon its conditioii. I t  is admirably adapted for carrying 
long articles, as ladders, tent-poles, and cvcn light moun- 
tain guns. The marching power of camels depends on a 
number of conditions. They are good goers in loose 
sandy soil, and even over stony ground, if the stones a re  
not too large and sharp ; in slippery places they are use- 
less, as they have no hold with their feet. They are very 
enduring, making the longest marches at  an avcrage speed 
of two miles an hour, and can ford deep rivers with ease 
if the current is not too rapid. When the bottom of t h e  
ford is shifting sand, the passage of a number of camels 
renders i t  firm. A string oi  500 camels covers about one  
mile of road;  1,250 mules, carrying the  same weight of 
supplies, occupy double the  distance. Camels must be un- 
laden at fcrrics. For military purposes these animals a r e  
purchased between the ages of five and nine years, and m a y  
be  used up  to the age of sixteen. They average about  
one tl~ousand pounds in weight, seven feet in height to 
the  top of the hump, and eight feet in length from nose 
to  tail. I n  camp and when not at  work they are arranged 
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in lines facing each other, or in circles heads inward ; the 
latter plan is the favorite lormation a t  night. The 
allowance of spare camels on service is ten per cent. 
Lieut. Martin, R. E., states that his company, of Sappers 
and Miners, was ablc to get an exceptional percentage 
of labor from the camels under his charge by attention t o  
certain details; and says further, that "camels are very 
and bite cach other badly when grazing. 
They can ford four feet of moderately running water, 
easily, if the bed is good ; but  a yard of greasy mud, a few 
inches deep, will throw many camels and delay a convoy 
for hours. Camel-bridges were carried on the leading 
camels, with a few shovels and picks, in every convoy of 
the Kandahar Field Force, and all small cuts or obstruc- 
tions were thus bridged in a few minutes ; the camels re- 
maining by their bridges (two gang-boards eight by three 
fect) until the last baggage camcl had passed. In  per- 
fectly open country, such as Kandahar to Girishk, it was 
found possible to march the camels on a broad front, 
the whole convoy being a rough square ; camels start- 
ing at  3 A.M. have been lc~lown t o  arrive at  camp ten 
miles off as late as 5 P.M." 
Captain Yaldwyn says: " A  camel's carrying-power is 
equal to that  of two and a half mules or ponies, whilst his 
ration is only about that of one mule or pony. Thus 500 
camels only eat as much as 5 0 0  mules or  ponies, and 
whilst the latter can only carry 1,000 ~naz~fzds* the 
% ~rtrai6nd is 80 pounds. 
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former can carry 2,500. Again, 500 camels only re- 
quire 125 attendants to be paid, clothcd, and fed, whilst 
1 
i 500 mules or ponics rcquirc 167 attendants." But, on the 
other hand, the immense losses of camels from excessive 
heat or cold, or over-exertion in mountainous or rough 
I roads, and other causes, greatly neutralize the force of 
this comparison. 
The jtnbz? is a hardy mountain pony used by the 
Afghans for the saddle and packing purposes; they are 
I very strong, activc, and sure-footed, and have been 
frcquently used by the British forces in their military 
operations. In 1839 Captain (afterward Gencral) Outram 
relates that his ynbz~, " although but thirtecn hands 
high, carried me and my saddlebags, weighing altogether 
upward of sixteen stone, the whole distance from ICalLt L 
in seven days and a half (an average of nearly forty-seven I 
milcs a day), during which time I had passed I I I hours on f I 
its back ; there was no saddle on the pony, merely a cloth l 
over his back." 
They will carry from four to five maunds with perfect 
ease, malting journeys of thirty miles a day. Those which 
are ridden and which amble, are called yurgns. The 
Afghans tie a knot in the middle of the long tails of their 
horses, which, they say, strengthens the animal's bacl- 
bone ! 
The Afghan donkey was severely tested in 1880 during 
the operations of Sir Donald Stewart between Icabul and 
Kandahar, and this class of carriage was found very useful 
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in the conveyance of provisions. Afghan donkeys 
will march with troops and carly loads of grain or flour, 
averaging ninety pounds, without difficulty. They lrcep 
pace wit11 mules or ponies in a baggage column, as they 
avoid the frequent checks ~vhich retard the larger animals ; 
they browse on the line of march, and find their own for- 
age easily in the neighborhood of camp ; they are easily 
controlled and cared for, and are on all accounts the most 
inexpensive transport in Eastern countries.+ 
The transport animals found in India and Turlrestan 
will be described in the parts of this boolr devoted to  the 
military resources of those regions. 
In concluding this sketch of the "Threshold of India," 
a mere glance at; the military history of the country will 
suffice. In fact, only so far as it may have a bearing upon 
the present, has reference to the past any place in this 
volume. 
The  early periods o i  eventful interest to Afghanistan 
have been already noted a t  the opening of this chapter. 
Its purely Oriental experiences were beginning to fade 
with the death of Nadir Shah-variously termed the 
"Butcher of Delhi," and the "\Vallace of I'ersia," in I 747. 
His progress toward India, from which he  was to tear its 
choicest treasure and loot its greatest city, reminds one of 
the Arabian Nights. A camp-follower from Jclalabad re- 
ported as follows: " He has 36,000 horsemen with him- 
self ** * -" After morning prayers he  sits on a throne, 
'k Lieut.-Col. E. F. Chapman, C.B., R.A. 
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the canopy of which is in the form of a dome and of gold. 
One thousand young men, with royal standards of red 
sill< and the lance tops and tassels of silver, are disposed 
regularly ; and, at a proper distaqce, live hundred beautiful 
slaves, from twelve to  twenty years old, stand-one half on 
his right and the other on his left. All the great mcll 
stand fronting him; and the Arzbkgi stands between, in 
readiness to represent whatcver he is desired, and every- 
body has his cause decided a t  once : bribery is not so 
m'uch as known hcre. I-Ic has particular information 
given him of every thing that passes ; all criminals, great 
and small, rich and poor, meet with immediate death. He 
sits till noon, after which he dines, then reposcs a little ; 
when afternoon prayers are over he sits till the cvening 
prayers, and when they are over he shoots fivc arrows into 
the Khnk Tzjdah, and then goes into thc women's apart- 
ments." * 
The splendor of the Robber Icing has departed, but his 
deeds of blood and treachery have often been repeated in 
the country of the Afghans. 
A succession of struggles between Afghan and Pel-sian 
leaders for the controlof Afghanistan marked the next fifty 
years. 
Whcn the project of Russian invasion of India, sug- 
gested by Napoleon, was under consideration in Pcrsia, 
a British envoy was sent, in 1809, to the then Shah Sujah, 
and received the most cordial reception a t  Pcahawur. 
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13ut Shah Sujah was, in 1810, superseded by his brother, 
Mahmucl, and the latter was pressed hard by the son of 
his Wazir to such an extent that I3erat alone remained 
to him. In 1823 his former kingdom passed to  Dost 
Mohammed, who in 1826 governed Kabul, I<andal~ar, 
Ghazni, and Peshawur. The  last-named place fell into 
the hands of Runjeet Singh, the " Lion of the Punjab." 
Dost Mohammed then applied to England for aid in 
recovering Peshawur, failing in which he threatened to 
turn to Russia. 
That Power was (1837) engaged in fomenting trouble in 
the western part of Afghanistan, encouraging an  attack 
by 30,000 Persians, led by Russian officers, upon I-Ierat. 
Instead of acceding t o  the request of Dost Mohammed, 
the British Governor-General-Lord Auclcland-declared 
war against that potentate, alleging in a proclamation 
that " the  welfare of the English possessions in the East 
rendcrcd it necessary to have an ally on their western 
frontier who would be in favor of peace, and opposed t o  
all disorders and innovations." 
This was the beginning of intrigues relating to Afghan- 
istan on the part, alternately, of England and Russia, in 
which John Bull has had to  pay, literally, " the  lion's 
share" of thc cost: in blood and treasure. In 1850, Sir 
John Cam I-Iobhouse, President of the Board of Control 
in India confessed : "The Afghan war was done l?y ~~zyss l f ;  
the Court of Directors had nothing to do with,it." The  
reason already mentionid was alleged as an excuse for 
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hostilities. They were declarcd, notwithstanding that the 
British political agent a t  thc  Court of Dost Mohammed 
reported that ruler as "entirely English" in his sympa- 
thies. This report was suppressed. Twenty years latcr the 
factswere given to Parliament, Russian letters were found 
implicating the Czar's ministers, and the English agent, 
Burnes, was vindicated. 
The Anglo-Indian army-consisting of twenty thousand 
troops, fifty thousand followers, and sixty thousand 
camels-advanced in two columns, one from Bengal, and 
the other from Bombay by the Indus. Scindc, which 
had hitherto been independent, lilcc the Punjab and 
Lahore, was subjugated e7c route, and nine thousand mcn 
were left behind to  occupy it. On the 23d of February, 
1839, a simultaneous advance from Shiltarpur, on the 
Bolan Pass, commcnced. Icandahar was occupied April 
25t11, Ghazni July z3d, and Kabul August 6th, and Shah 
Sujah was proclaimed Ameer by British authority. By 
the following September the greater part of the  English 
forces returned to India. Only five regiments of infantry 
and one of cavalry remained in Afghanistan, where sus- 
picious symptoms of discontent with the new order of 
things began very soon to show themselves. During the 
summer of 1840 insurrections had to be put down by 
force in several places. In  November of the same ycar 
Dost Mohammed defeated the English in the Pcrwan 
Pass. From that time until the autumn of 1841 a sultry 
calm reigned in the country. 
The  English commanders, although fully aware of the 
state of mind of the people, neglected to take the most 
simple measures of precaution. 
The  local control was vested in a mixed military and 
civil council, consistiilg of General Elphinstone, uilfittcd 
by disease and natural irresolutioll from exercising the 
functions of command, and Sir William McNaghten, the 
British envoy, whose self-confidence and trust in the 
treacherous natives made him an easy victim. I n  the 
centre of an insurrection which was extending day by day 
under their eyes and under their own roofs, these repre- 
sentatives of a powerful nation, with a small but effective 
force, deliberately buried their hcads in the sand of their 
credulity, not realizing the nature of the  danger which for 
wecks was evident to  many of their subordinates. 
Finally a force of the insurgents, under the direction of 
the son of the deposed ruler, Altbar Khan, threw off the dis- 
guise thcy had assumed before the English, and taking pos- 
session of the Ichurd I<abul Pass near thc  city, entirely cut 
off the retreat t o  India which Elphinstone had commenced. 
As  there was no intelligent coilcert of action among the 
British leaders, the garrison melted away in detail, the 
Afghan auxiliaries refused to  fight, o r  turned their arms 
against the Europeans. Sir William McNaght en was 
murdered' by Altbar, a t  a coui~cil in sight of the  garrison. 
A few attempts t o  force a passage, or to defend them- 
selves, made b y  certain brave officers of the beleagured 
force, failed. 
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On January 6, 1842, an agreement was made by which 
the Afghan leader promised to ensure to the British forces 
a safe withdrawal to India. This was violated with 
Afgllatl readiness, and the entire Anglo-Indian contingent 
of sevcntcen thousand souls was destroyed; sacrificed 
to the murderous brutality of the Afghan insurgents, 
or dying from exposurc to  one of the most severe winters 
lc~lown to that region. Months after, heaps of dead 
bodies, preserved by the intense cold, obstructed the 
mountain passes. The horrors of Moscow wcre rcpcated 
in the IChurd ICabul, and the noblest attributes of 11~- 
manity were exemplified in the acts of the officers and 
soldiers of the doomed party. Only twenty of this entire 
force survived. The news of this horrible disaster was 
brought to Jelalabad by the only mail who penetrated 
the Afghan environment, Dr. Brydon. 
On receipt of the news of this overwhelming catastro- 
phe, the Indian Government endeavored to rescue the 
garrisons of ICandahar and Ghazni, as well as that of 
Jelalabad; but the Mohammedan troops refused to 
march against their co-religionists, and the Sikhs also 
showed great unwillingness. T h e  garrison of Ghazni, 
thinking to secure its safety by  capitulation, was cut 
to pieces December 23, 1841. Jelalabad, held by 2,400 
men under General Sale, still withstood the storm lilce a 
rock of  iron. General Nott, the energetic officer com- 
manding at Kandahar, on receiving the news of the de- 
struction of the British, blew up the ,citadel of the town, 
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destroyed eveiy thing not necessary to, his object, and 
started, August 8, 1842, for Ghazni, which he also de- 
stroyed, Septcmber Gth. 
Another British force of twelve thousand men, under 
General Polloclt, was organized at Peshawur, to  punish the 
Afgl~ans, and, so far as might be, retrieve thc errors of 
Elphinstone and McNaghten. Pollock's operations were, 
in the sense of retaliation, successf~~l.  An eminent Ger- 
man authority wrote : " ICabul and other towns were 
from guns, and the people were collected together and de- . British 
stroyed lilte worms." General Polloclc carried the famous . , 
Khaiber Pass, in advancing to the relief of Jelalabad in ' 
sion tl 
April, 1842. This was the first time that the great defile 
-twenty-eight miles in length-had ever been forced by As ! 
arms. Timur Lang and Nadir Shah, a t  the head of their 
"It 
enormous hosts, bought a safe passage through it from : 
would 
the Afridis. Akbar the Great, in 1587, is said to have lost ;, but re 
forty thousand men in attempting to force it, and Aurang- 
zeb failed to get through. 
The misfortune of Elphinstone's command, great as it that w 
was, would have been much more humiliating to England, tains." 
had it not becn for the firmness of the gallant General , 
of the objects of the expedition-the deliverance of the 
of fait 
against such a suicidal act on the part of any Englishman 
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111 the forced march to Icabul, which Pollock made subse- 
cluently, the force of about eight thousand men moved in 
as light order as possible. Aftcr loading the com~nissariat 
camels to their utmost carrying capacity, the General dis- ' 
covered that the mounted men had in their ltit a spare 
pair of pai~taloons apiece, 011 which. he ordered the legs 
to be fillcd with graill and carried by the men in front of 
them, on their saddles. By the  middle of December the  
British had started on their return march, pursued as far 
as the Indus by the Afghans, and by this hurried conclu- 
sion to the war lcssened their prestige in Asia to  an 
enormous degree. 
As Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote: 
' l  I t  was not so much the fact of our &treat ; disaster 
would have been diminished, if not altogether overcome ; 
but retreating as we did, pursued even through thc last 
pass into the plains by an implacablc enemy, the impres- 
sion became universal in India as well as in Central Asia, 
that we had simply been driven back across the inoun- 
tains." 
A very able I-Iindu gentleman, very loyal to the British, 
traced the mutiny of 1857 in a great measure to the Af- 
ghan campaign of I 842. H e  said: " I t  was a direct breach 
of faith to take tlze Sepoys out of India. Practically they 
were compelled to go for fear of being treated as muti- 
neers, but the double pay they received by no means 
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compensated them for losing caste. Thc Sepoys mis. 
trusted thc Government from that timc forward, alld 
were always fearing that thcir caste would bc dcstroycd; 
besides, the Kabul disaster taught them that Europeans 
were not invincible." 
The  departure of the English forces was followccl by 
tile i-e~stablish~ncnt of Dost Mohammed's authority in 
Afghanistan. Once, at  the time of the Silt11 insurrection, 
the Dost cl*ossed the Indian border with two thousand 
l~orsemen, and narrowly escaped falling into thc hands of 
the British in the affair of Gujrat, February 21, r 849, 
where the specd of his horse alone saved him irom capture. 
In 185s a better unclcrstailding was clfectcd between the 
son of Dost Mohammed and his powcrful Eu~opcan 
neighbor. He rcconquercd Balk11 in 1850, and gained 
Icandahar by inheritance in I 855, while he lost Herat to 
the Persians in 1856. With the aid of Grcat Britain, in 
1857, Persia rclinquished a11 claims to  Herat, but thc Dost 
had cvcntually t o  besiege that city, occupicd by a rcbcl- 
lious faction, in 1863, and after a siege of tcll months re- 
duced the place, only to find a tomb within its walls. 
After the usual struggle for the thl-one, pcculiar to a 
change of dynasty in Afghanistan, S l~crc  Ali, one of the 
Dost's sons, prevailed, and was recognized in  1S68. The 
ncxt dccade was notable for a serics of diplomatic mnnceu- 
vrcs betwccn Englaiid and Russia. for Afghan friendship. 
Shere Ali now lcallcd toward thc Lion, now in tlle dircc- 
tion of the Bear, with the  regularity of a pendulu~n. The 
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advances were received with presents and promises on the  
one hand, and promises, powerful embassies, and imposing 
military expeditions on the other. On September 21, 
1875, a British ambassador was turned back by the Afghan 
com~nandant of the frontier fort of Ali Musjid, and on 
the 20th of November, of t he  same year, war was declarcd 
against Shere Ali by  the Anglo-Indian Govcrnmcnt. A t  
that time thc Russian General Icaufmnnn was operating 
on the northern border of Afghanistan with a forcc of 
fifteen thousand men and sixty guns, and the Amecr had 
reason to  thinL that he could rely 011 Russian cooperation 
against the English, who, with a forcc of forty thousand 
mcn, promptly invaded his dominion. 
This force moved into Afghanistan in four columns, 
under the  command, rcspectivcly, of Generals Urowne, 
Roberts, Biddulph, and Stewart, with reserves under Gcn- 
erals Maude and Primrose. 
We shall have occasion later t o  consider some of the 
details of the protractcd operations which followed, 
They e~nbraccd several admirably conducted marches, 
exposure to  excessively severe winter weather, the  suc- 
ccssful surmounting of great natural obstaclcs, the  devel- 
opmcnt of the usual weakness in t he  dcpartrneit of 
transport, with unnecessary losses in animals, a consider- 
able sicklist, and an inconsidcrablc proportion of killed 
and wounded in action. 
The military benefits were those resulting from a long 
and arduous field expcricncc in a rough country. T h e  
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interruption to these actual " field manceuvres," this " fire- 
drill," by the enemy, was comparatively feeble,-as a rule, 
stimulating the Anglo-Indian force to  put its best foot 
foremost. Under this system, at the end of the two 
years' campaign, all departments of the army 11a.d become 
moulded into the efficient machines essential to success in 
any military venture. 
Politically, the campaign had been a failure. The  fate 
of the gallant Major Cavagnari and his mission, mur- 
dered at Kabul, Septeinber 3, 1879, made a deeper iin- 
pression on the Afghan mind than the British occupation 
of Afghan cities or the Afghan losses in battle. 
In the same year the British Secretary for India, in 
London, wrote to the Governor-General that : " I t  appears 
that as the result of two successful campaigns, of the 
employment of an immense force, ancl of thc expenditure 
of large sums of money, all that has yet been accom- 
plished has been the disintegration of the State  which it 
was desired to see strong, friendly, and independent, the 
assuinption of fresh and unwelconle liabilities in regard 
to one of its provinces, and a condition of anarchy 
throughout tlle remainder of the country." 
Early in the year 1880, the  British Government pre- 
pared to make a dignified withdrawal from Afghanistan. 
That volcanic region was by no means tranquil, although 
the  chief rebel, Yakoub IChan, had becn driven out of 
Kabul by General Roberts, and had retircd to  t he  distant 
country of the Heri-i-rad. A t  this time appearcd the  
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exiled Abdurraliman Khan, who had long resided at 
Tash]tend, and who was welcomcd warmly by the local 
sirdars on the northern frontier of Afghanistan. As hc 
Kabul his authority and influence increased, 
and the British political officers, acting under instructions, 
formally recog~lized him as Amccr of that district, In 
the meanwhiIe Yalcoub advanced wcstward from I-Terat 
with a strong force, encountered a British brigade, under 
General Burrows, near the Helmund, and utterly routcd 
it. The rem~lailt of t he  European force took refuge in 
I<andahar, wherc General Primrose was in command. 
Surrounding the city, Yalcoub succeeded in effectually 
"bottling up" the British garrison for some time. Sir 
Fredcriclc Robcrts, however, made a rapid march from 
Kabul on I<andahai-, and  after a successful and decisive 
battlc with the Afghans, completely dispcrsed the  native 
force, and relieved thc beleaguered garrison. Soon aftcr, 
Abdurrahman was formally installed as A~neer  of Afghani- 
stan, and the British army withdrew froin the country. 
T E E  BRITISH FORCES AND ROUTES. 
A SICETCH of the military resources of Great Britain, 
more especially thosc available for ficld service in Afghan- 
istan, with notes upon the strength and composition of 
the  forces, meails of transport and supply, nature of im-  
portant lines of coininunication, and of certain strategic 
points in the probable theatre of operations, will be 
attempted in this chaptcr. 
O~gaalzizntio7z.-Thc military system of Great Britain is 
based ulsoil voluntary enlistment instead of the usual  
European plan of uilivcrsal liability to  servicc. Recruits 
may enlist eithcr for the  " short-servicc " or " long-service" 
term ; the first bcing for six years in the ranks and six on 
furlough, and tlic last for twclvc years in thc ranks; the 
furlough of short-service mcn is passcd in the a r m y  
rcscrve, and then, in consideration of liability to  bc rccallcd 
t o  the colors, the inen are paid sixpence a day. 
The  troops of the Standing Army, (Unitcd Icingdom,) 
March, 1885, were proportionately distributed as follo\vs : 
forty-three per cent. in England, two per ccnt. in Scot -  
lancl, twenty-five per cent. in Ircland, and thirty-iivc per 
cent. abroad, not including India. 
Fo r  purposes of administration, instruction, and mobili- 
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zation, Great Britain and Ireland are partitioned into 
tllirtecn military districts commanded by gcnernl officers. 
These arc sub-dividcd as follows : for thc infantry onc 
hundred and two sub-districts undcr regimental com- 
manders ; for the artillery there arc twelve sub-districts, 
and for the cavalry two districts. The brigade of an in- 
falltry sub-district con~prises usually two line battalions, 
two militia battalions, the brigade dep8t, rifle volunteer 
corps, and infantry of the army reserve. Of the line bat- 
talions onc is gellcrally at home and one abroad. In  an 
artillcry sub-district are comprised a proportion of the , 
royal artillery ancl artillery of the militia, volunteers, and 
army reserve respcctively. In  likc manncr a cavalry 
sub-district illcludes thc yeomanry and army rcserve 
cavalry. 
The  officers on duty in the Adjutant-General's and 
Qunrtermastcr's departments of tbe British army are, as a 
rule, detailed for a term of five years from the Linc, but 
must rcjoin their regin~cnts immccliately upon ordcrs for 
I foreign service. 
T h e  Royal Engineers then were and are organized 
into forty-three companies. 
T h e  cavalry is divided into the Ilousehold Cavalry and 
Cavalry of the Line. Tile first named comprises the 1st 
and zd Life Guards and Royal Horse 'Guards,-three 
regiments. The Line is composed of twenty-eight regi- 
ments, as follows : seven of dragoon guards, three 
of dragoons, thirteen of hussars, five of lancers. The 
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strength of regiments varies from 450 to 625 men with 
from 300 to 400 troop horses each. 
The  artillery-under the title of the Royal Regiment of 
Artillery-is divided into three classes ; the Royal Horse 
Artillery of two brigades of twelve batteries each, 1naking 
a brigade total of sixty guns ; the  Field Artillery of four 
brigades of seventy-six batteries, and the Garrison Artillcry 
of eleven brigades. For  the non-professional reader it may 
be well to say that, in the horse artillery, all tl~epe?=ronnelof 
a battery is mounted, the better t o  act with cavalry or 
mounted infantry ; under the general term "field artillery" 
may be classed mountain batteries (only maintained in 
India), field 'batteries proper, in which the guns are 
somewhat heavier, arid served by gunners who are not 
I mounted, but on occasion are carried on the limbers I 
and on seats attached to the axlcs, and in an einergcncy 
may be carried on the " off" horses of teams. Undcr the 
class "field artillery," also, would come such large guns as 
are required in war for siege or other hcavy opcrations, 
and which in India or Afghanistan would be drawn by 
bullocl<s. 
The  ii~lantry is composed of thc Guards, tlle Line, and 
the Rifles. The Guards consist of thrcc regirncnts- 
Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, and Scots Fusilier 
Guards; in all scven battalions. The  Line comprises 
102 regiments (204  battalion^); the Rifles four battalio~ls. 
Bcsides these there are two regiments of Colonial (West 
India) colored troops, 
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T h e  Militia is intended for local dcfcnce, b u t  can be 
ordered a~lywhere  within the  United I<ingdom, and is 
available for garrisoil du ty  in the Mediterranean. En- 
listment in the  militia is for six years. The officers are 
commissioned b y  the Queen, and, as  before noted, all the  
details of control and recruitment are entrusted t o  district 
commanders. For  instruction this force may be called 
out, for a pcriod not t o  exceed eight weelts annuallj-, with 
regular officers as  instructors. There  are 2 12 battalions of 
infantry, 25 brigades of garrison artillery, and 3 regi- 
ments of engineers comprised in this force. 
T h e  Militia Reserve, limited to one fourth of the active 
militia, is liable t o  army service in case of an einergei~cy, 
and for t h e  tcrm of  six years is entitled to £1 pcr annum. 
T h e  Volunteers represent '' the bulwark " in  case of in- 
vasion ; they are orgailized principally as  garrison artilleiy 
and infantry. The officers are coin~l~iss io~lcd by t b e  
county lieutellants, subject t o  the approval of t11e Queen. 
T h e  mcn arc recruited, armed, and instructed b y  tlle Gov- 
ernment. Recruits a re  required t o  attend thirty drills, 
and afterward not less than nine clrills annually. T h e  
voluilteer lorce is co~nposed of 278 battalio~ls of infantiy, 
46 brigades .of garrison artillery and 15  battalions of 
engineers. 
T h e  Yeomanry Cava l~y  are equipped as light cavalry, 
drilI eight days per year, and are subject to call in case of 
riot and insurrection, when each mail xvith a horse receives 
seven pence a day. There are thirty-eigl~t regiments. 
The Ariny of India differs from that of the United 
Kingdom, not only in its composition, but in the cl~ai-ac- 
tcr of its organization. This organizatioil clatcs from 
1858, ~ v l ~ c n  the govcrnrnent passed from the East India 
Company to  the Crown. 
The European regiments serving in India arc in all re- 
spects organized and maintained, as in England. In 
each prcsideilcy forming the thrce political subdivisions, 
and among xvl~ich the Anglo-Indian army is distributed, 
exists a staff corps which supplies all European officers 
permitted to serve with native troops. T11ese officers 
must pass certain examinations before they can be as- 
signed to any of the following vacancies in any native 
regiment. 
EUROPEANS 
I Commandnnt, 
r Second-in-co~urnnnd 
and wing oiiicer, 
I Wing-offifiue~., 
2 Wing-subalterns, 
r AcIjata11t, 
I Qt~arlermnster, 
I Medical officer. 
INDIAN REGIMENT. 
I NA'rIVES. 
z Sabadars (captains), 1st class, 
2 " " zd " 
4 " ' 3d " 
4 Jemandars (lieats.), 1st " 
4 " " 2 c l "  
I Ilavildar (serfit.-major), 
40 I-Inviltlal-s (st.1-geants), 
40 Naiclts (corporals), 
16 Drummers, 
600 Sepoys (privates). 
The  duties of the commandant of a native regiment 
correspond in general to those of a similar officer in a 
European corps. Three times a weck he holds a " clur- 
bar," for the trial of offeilders and transaction of general 
regimental business. T h e  mcn are paid by  the native 
officers in presence of the European " Wing-officer," who 
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is rcspoilsible for 'all public property issued to his half 
battalion, or wing. 
The  native officers are commissioned by the Indiall 
Government, and, gs a rule, arc promoted fl-o~n t11c ranks, 
2nd are of the sallle caste as thc privatcs. Ccrtain native 
officers of  the engineers and artillery may be eligible t o  ap- 
poiiltment in the correspondi~lg European corps; one is 
always assigned as an aide-de-camp to the Viccroy. When 
on detailed service, a native officer is allowed to command 
his company, but "no battalion parades sboulcl talte place 
without tlle presence of a British officer." .$ In each regi- 
ment there is a drill-sergeant and drill-corporal, who re- 
ceive extra pay for their services. Corporals are promoted 
from privatcs who kilow how to read and write in a t  least 
one cl~aracter, or \vho have displayed extraordinary cour- 
age. The  pay per month of a scpoy is equal to  $3.50 ; 
havildar, $7; jemandar, $17.50 ; subadas, $33.50 t o  $50. 
European officers wit11 native regiments : commandant, 
$620; wing-officers, $302 to  $32" adjutant, $237.86; 
quartermaster, $ I  87.86 ; medical officers, $300, ~nonthly. 
The annual pay-roll of a native regiment of 720 comba- 
tants and 45 non-combatants alnounts to about $69,114. 
In consideration of the pay each sepoy is required t o  
provide his rations and clotl~ing, except one coat a i d  one 
pair of trousers issued by tlie. Governmeilt every two 
years ; in consequence, each rcgiment is accompanied by 
a native village callcd a bazaar, containing tradesmen of 
- - 
*Indian Army Regulations. 
I 
all kinds ; this bazaar is under strict cliscipline and is man- 
aged by the quartermaster. The entire outfit follows the 
regiment into thc field. 
Colonel Gordon of the Indian army testifies : " With 
regard to native troops under a cannonade I may say that  
I saw our native infantry twice undcr the fire of the 
Afghan mountain guns, and thcy behavcd veiy s t c a d i l ~  
and coolly. Ammunition was economically expended. I 
attributed much the small loss sustaincd by the troops in 
Afghanistan to our excellent straight shooting." 
The cavalry of India has in certain instances borne an 
excellent?rcputation for efficiency in action, is well set up, 
and in its instruction and discipline is modelled after the 
British systcm. The  artillery comprises well-instructed 
native organizations, but its principal experience has been 
with light field guns against irregular troops. T h e  Achilles 
heel of the Indian army consists in this, that  there are but 
eight European officcrs to each regiment, and of these but 
six would be available t o  lcad in battle : the  quarter- 
master and surgeon being at  such a time otherwise en- 
gaged. Thc native officers, seldom having an opportunity 
to command in Peace, would be unreliable leaders in such 
an cmergency. A t  the action of Ali Musjid, November 21, 
1878, the day before the occupation of that fort, six 
British officers of a native battalion were placcd hors de 
co7?zbnt, so that on the first day after crossing thc  Afghan 
fronticr there was but one European officer to manage the 
regiment. 
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The feudatoiy chiefs of India enjoy an aggregate 
I.Cveilue of some ~ 1 ~ , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,  equal to  more than one 
third of the illcome of the British Government of 111clia. 
They inaintaiil forces aggregating 350,000 mcil with 4,000 
guns to perform thc duties of court ceremonial, garrison, 
~nilitarjr police, guards, and escorts, throughout territorics 
aggrcgatiilg nearly 600,000 square miles with 50,000,000 
of inhabitants. Thcse forces are unreservedly held at the 
disposal of the Crown by the native Princes. 
Trn~lsport and Sz$f@.-This esseiltial featurc of all 
wars will be briefly coilsidered in the light of the Anglo- 
Afghan War of 1879-80. Large quantities of supplics 
were transported froin the maill base of operations on thc 
Indus, and distributed to the ti-oops in the field over four 
or five distinct liiles of communication, and over roads 
a i d  moulltaill paths of va~iecl degrees of ruggedness. 
Thc country on both sides of the Indo-Afghan frontier 
was severely taxed to furnish the necessary animals. 
Part of the transport was hired-and as in the case of 
the Urahuis camels-with thc services of the owners, 
\vIlo were easily offended and Iiltely to-decamp with their 
property in a night. During the first year the system was 
under the direct control of the commissariat depart- 
ment; but as this proved unsatisfactory, in the subsequellt 
campaign it  was elltirely reorganized and superintcndccl by 
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a n  officer of engineers, with a large number of officers 
from the  Line to  assist. This  gave better satisfaction. 
Immense numbers of camels died from heat,* overworlr, 
irregular food, and neglect. Owing to t h e  dryness of t h e  I 
climate and intense heat of the summer the bullocli-carts 
were perpetually falling to  pieces. T h e  mules, donkeys,  
and ponies gave the best results, but d o  not abound  in 
sufficient quantities t o  enable an army in Afghanistan 
to  dispense with camels. A s~iccessful experiment in 
rafting, from Jelalabad to Dalrka, was tried. Tlle ra f t s  
consisted of inflated skins lashed together with a l i gh t  
framework; between June 4-13, seven tllousand sk ins  
were used, and, in all, 885 soldiers and  one thousand I 
tons of stores were transported forty miles down t h e  
Kabul River, the journey talringfive hours. A great dea l  
o f  road-malring and repairing was done under tlle super- i j 
vision of the transport corps. A system of " s t a g e s "  
or relays of pack-animals or carts was organized, by 
which a regular quantity of supplies was forwarded over  I I 
tlle main lines, daily, with almost the regularity, if no t  
I I 
the speed, of rail carriage. The  great number of an imals  
employed required a correspoilding force of a t tendants ,  
inspectors, and native doctors, all of whom served to 
make up that excessive army of " followers " for wh ich  
Anglo-Indian expeditions are famous. Drivers were  
*Of a train of eighteen huadred nnloncled camels on the road froril 
Dadur to Jacobabad, for six days in June, six hundred clicd of exl~austion.  
I n  March, 1855 Col. Green, C.B., lost one hundred 311d seventeen horses  out 
of four hundred, from the heat, during a march of thirty miles. 
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required a t  the following ratc : one clriver for each pair 
I of bullocl<s, every four camcls, cvery three mules and 
ponies, every six donlreys. *s 
The great obstacle to  the satisfactory operation of the 
transport system was its ilovelty and cxperiinental charac- 
ter, and that its organization had to  be combined with its 
execution. Besides which, cholera broke out  in June and 
swept away three hundred cmployPs. Grazing camps 
were established in the ncigl~borl~ood of the  Bolan Pass 
for the bulloclcs, and aqueducts built for the coilveyance 
of a water supply; one of thcsc was of masonry, more 
than a mile in lcngth, from Dozan dowil to thc Bolan. 
I t  has been statcd that grazing was scarce in thc region of 
the Bolan : in 1879 more than four thousand bulloclcs t I 
were grazed there during the suinmcr, and large quantities 
of foragc were cut for winter use. I 
Any prolonged military operations in Afghanistan 
must, to a ccrtain extent, utilize hired transport, although 
there are many objections urged. I 
Sir Richard Tcinplc said (1879) : " That  the amount of 
transport required for active service, such as  the late cam- 
paign in Afghanistan, is so grcat that to hirc transport is 1 
synonymous to  pressing it froill the pcoplc of tllc district 
from which it is hired, and impressment of the ineans of 
transport must lead to  impressincnt of drivers, who 
- 
* T l ~ e  average carrying power of c c r t n i ~ ~  Icinds of Lrmsporl, in pounds, is as 
follows : bt&ffoclr-caj*ls (wit11 two pails), on fairly lcvcl grou~~cl ,  1 400 ; onl~il ly I 
ground, 1,000 ; (will1 onc pair) on fairly lcvcl gro~nicl, 850 ; on hilly g~ound,  
650 ; caazels, 400 ; arztles, 200 ; $o~~ies,  175 ; nzefz, 50. 
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naturally (having no interest whatevcr in the campaign in 
rvhich they arc called ~ ~ p o n  to  serve) rcndcr the most un- 
willillg service and take the carliest opportunity of ren- 
dering their animals uilserviceable in hopes of escaping a 
clistasteful duty. This scrvice is frequently so uilpopular 
that, sooner than lcave thc  boundaries of thcir native 
country, the impressed drivers desert, leaving their ani- 
mals in the  hands of thc transport authorities or take 
them away wit11 them. * 'x. * For thc above reasons 
I should recominend tha t  all transport for a campaign 
should be the property of Government." 
In commenting on this subject, Lord Wolseley relates 
that when scrving in China wit11 Indian troops he  "awolce 
one morning and found that all our drivers hacl bolted. 
Our transport collsisted of carts suppliecl by the Chinese 
Government, by contractors, and by the country generally. 
I do not think that the carts had bccn carried away, but 
all the rnules and men had disappeared except thrcc 
drivers wllo beroilged to  me. I was very much astonished 
that thcsc lnen had not bolted also. I had a small de- 
tachment of cavalry with me and a very excellent dufladar 
in charge of it. I aslced hiin how he  had managed to 
keep these drivers-having somc timc before said that 
unless he loolred after tbein wcll he woulcl never get to 
Pekin. I l c  replied, with some hesitation : ' I remcmber 
what you told me, and thc  fact is I tied the  tails of those 
thrce inen together, overnight, and then tied them t o  the 
tent pole, ancl put  a man ovcr them."' 
The Elephant, like the stage coach, finds his field of 
usefulness, as a meails of transport, growing smaller by 
degrees. H e  is still a feature in Inclia, and has becn used 
for military purposes to  some extent ill thc eastern part of 
Afghanistan. H e  will dbubtless form part of thc  means 
of transportation employcd by the British forces near 
their present base, and in rear of thc Kabul-I<anclahar 
line, and for that reason is ~loticcd l~erc.+; 
The Superintendent of the Governincilt Elcpllailt I<hed- 
dabs at Daltka has givcn us, in a rcccilt papcr, much infor- 
mation concerning the elephant in frccdom and captivity. 
H e  does not claim a 11ig11 ordcl- of ii~tclligci~ce, but  rathcr 
of extraordinary obedience and docility for this animal. 
Vely large elephants arc exceptional. Twice round the 
forcfoot gives the height a t  thc  shouldcr ; few femalcs at- 
tain the height of eight fcet ; " tuslters," or inalc cle- 
phants, vary from eight to nine feet ;  the Maharajah of 
Nahur, Sirmoor, possesses one standing tcn fcct fivc and 
one half inchcs. The age varics from 80 to  150 years, ac- 
cording to  the bcst authorities, and it is recorded that 
those familiar with the haunts of thc wild elephant havc 
never found the bones of an elephant that  had dicd a 
natural death. In  freedom thcy roam in herds of t h i ~ t y  
to  fifty, always led by a female; inaturc about twenty- 
* The use of clcpl~ants in transporting ficlcl gtuls in Aighanistn~~ is cmphati- 
cally disco~~ragcd by those who served wit11 it last ;  very icw flanltcrs were 
employed to protecl thc Elephant artillcry usctl in the Karam vnllcy, n~ltl its 
success can oi~ly be interpreted by snpposing Ll~c clircct interposi~ion of lJrovi- 
clencc or the grossest stupidity to ollr iecl~lc cuemy. 
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five. In India the males only have tuslts ; in Ceylon only 
the females. They are fond of the water, swim well,% but 
call neither trot nor gallop ; their only pace is a wallr, 
which inay be increascd t o  a s/l//$e of fifteen inilcs an hour 
for a very short distance ; they cannot leap, and a ditch 
eight by eight feet would be impassable. 
In  Bcngal and Southern India elephants particularly 
abound, and seem to  be increasing in ilumbers. In  the 
Billigurungan Hills, a range of three hundred square miles 
on the borders of Mysore, they rnadc tllcir appearance 
about cighty years ago ; yet prior to that time this region 
was undcr high cultivation, traces of orcharcls, orange 
groves, and iron-smelting furnaces remaining ill what is 
now a l-~owling wildcrilcss. Elephants are caught in stock- 
ades or kraals. The Governmcnt employs l~unt ing  parties 
of 350 natives trained to the work, and Illore than IOO 
animals are sometimes secured in a singlc drive. 
New elephants arc trained by first rubbing thcm down 
with bamboo rods, and shouting at thcm, and by tying 
them with I-opes; thcy are taught t o  kneel by taking 
them into streams about five feet decp, when the sun is 
hot, and prodding thcm on thc back with sharp sticks. 
The total number of elephants rnaiiltaillecl is eight hun- 
dred, of which one half are used for military purposes. 
Thcy consume about 400 pounds of green, or 250 pouilds 
of dry foddcr daily, and are also given unhuskecl rice. 
*Elephants have been known to swim a river three hundred yards wide 
with the liind legs tied together. 
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An elephallt is expccted to carry about 1,200 pounds with 
ease. In the Abyssinian Expedition elephants travelled 
many hundreds of miles, carrying from 1,500 to 1,800 
pou~lds (including their gear), but out of forty-four, five 
died from exhaustion ; they are capable of worlcing from' 
morning to night, or of remaining under their loads for 
twenty hours at  a stretch." 
An elephant's gear consists of agacEdeZ0, or quilted cloth, 
I& inches thick, reachiilg half-way dowil his sides and from 
the neck to thc croup. 011 this is placed thc g?~d~kl,  or 
pad, 6 x 5 feet ailci g inches thick, formed of stout saclring 
stuffed with dried grass. The whole is girthed with a long 
rope passed twice around thc body, rouild the neclc as a 
breast-strap, and undcr the  tail as a cruppcr. The ~vhole 
weighs 200 pounds. A n  improvement upoil this has been 
made by our nuthority(Mr. Sanderson), ~v l~ i ch  secrns Lo bear 
the same relation to  the  old gear that  t hc  open McClellarl 
saddle does to thc ordinary British huntiag saddlc. I t  
consists (sce illustration) of two pads entircly detached, 
each 4 feet long, 1 5  inches wide, and 6 inches thick, made 
of blankct covcrccl with tarpaulin, aiicl encased in stout 
sacliing. One is placed on each sidc of the elephant's 
spine, and rctaiiled there by two iron archcs. There 
is no sacldlc-cl'oth, the load rests on the ribs ; the breast- 
* There is no "elephant gun-dtill" laid dow11 in the In~peri,tl Regllations, 
but when the gnn gocs illlo action the elephant is made Lo l;~iccl, aiid long 
' ' sltids " m e  placed against the crilclle upon wllicll the p n  rests, so as to fo1111 
an i~lcli~lccl plane to the ground. The gun is then lifter1 off Llle cradle and , 
down the skids by levers and Lnclcle. 
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strap and crupper hoolr into rings on the saddlc ; there 
are rings to fasten the load to ; it weighs 140 pounds. 
With foot-boards it is convenient for riding; a cradle call 
also bc attached for carrying field guns. Reccnt experi- 
ments have shown thc pi-acticabili~y of conveying cle- 
p l ~ a l ~ t s  by rail in ordinary open cattlc-trucks; they were 
indifferent to the motion, noiscs, or bridgcs ; it is said that 
32 elephants could bc thus carried on onc train. 
Thc excellc~lt railway facilities for moving troops and 
supplies to the Indo-Afghan frontier wcre described in 
1880, by Traffic Manager Ross, of the Scindc, Punjnb, and 
Delhi Railway, bcfore the Unitcd Scrvicc Iilstitutio~l of 
India. 
I-Ie stated that experiments had been made by the ~nili- 
tary and railway authorities in loading and disembarking 
troops and war nzntc'rirl, and that much experience had 
been afforded by the Afghan operatioils of 1878-9. 
Tbe moveinent of troops to and from the frontier com- 
menced in October, 1878, and ended June, 1879. During 
that period were conveyed over his road ~go,ooo men, 
33,000 animals, 500 guns, I 12,000,000 pounds of militaiy 
stores. The rnaxi~num nuinbcr carricd in any one month 
was in November-40,ooo men, 8,000 animals, and 20,800, 
ooo pouilds of storcs. Thc grcatcst n~imbcr of special 
trains run in oilc day mas cight, carrying 4,100 men, 300 
animals, and 800,mo poui~cls of storcs. As an instance of 
rapid loading, when the 10th Bellgal Cavalry left for 
Malta, 80 horscs were loadcd on a train in 10 minutes 
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from the ordinary station platforn; the pack-ponies gave 
more trouble, having in some cases to be picked up bodily 
and pushed into the car. The  averagc time taken in 
loading up a squadron of cavalry, cotnprising 8 oficers, 
128 meil, 92 followers, 150 horses, and 10,800 pounds of 1 
baggage and ammunition, was from I hour t o  go minutes. 
Great difiiculty was found ill loading camels, for which 
a sling and crane is required. Thc specd of troop-trains 1 
was about 21 miles an hour. No accidents occurred. 
Mr. Ross stated that in case of emergency, 11 trains each 
way, could be run over the Lahore and Mooltan sectiol~, 
and 15 trains each .way ovcr t l ~ c  Lahorc and Delhi sec- 
tion ; this was the maximuin iluinbcr of trains capable of I I 
20 miles an hour wit11 35 cars, allowiilg for crossiilgs and I 
other necessary halts. At this rate 3 batteries of artil- 
lery, 2 regiments of cavalry, and 5 regiments of inlantry i 
(7,000 men), could bc concentrated a t  Lahore every 24 
hours. And by this line alone, 70,000 men, with gulls, 
horses, and storcs cornpletc, could be brought to Lahore 1 
in 10 days. As the nativc troops prcfcr cars without 1 
seats, ordinary box-cars are always ready ; 30 to 35 natives, 
or 8 horses, can be carried in a car. This is thc rail- 
way leading to I<urrachee, the scaport nearest to Quctta. 
Experience has shot1711 that t11c1-e is but little troublc t o  
accumulate large storcs of provisions for an army; particu- 
larly in or near the Inclo-Afghan frontier, providccl thcre 
is a force to  distribute it. Compressecl food and forage 
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will form part of the present British supplies. MecIicinc 
was oftcn deficicnt and illiberally issued. 
I~ztclli,neclzcr.-D~iri~lg thc later campaigns in Rfg l~an i s t a~~  
thc British Commanding Gencral has been invested witli 
supreme political authority, and the Political Departmcllt 
(which is a branch of the Foreign Departnlc~lt of thc GOV- 
emmcnt of India) has been undcr his coatrol; a political 
officer was gcnerally assigned to  the staff of each in&- 
pcndellt army commander, and lias had charge of all inili- 
taiy iatclligencc; these officers were familiar with thc 
language and habits of the Afghans, and wcrc also useful 
in obtaining supplies from the nativcs. The inforlnatioll 
obtained daily, ill this way and through the ordinary mili- 
tary scouts, was silted and compilecl in the Quartermaster- 
Gencral's office for the information of thc Commanding 
General. Maps of the country were supplied to all ' 
officcrs. The  I-Icliograph was used with markcd success 
in sigllalling in that mountaillous country. Messagcs 
wcre sent from Kabul to Jamrud, 190 miles, with but four 
intermediate stations, and again between Kabul a i d  Gun- 
dainuck, seventy-five milcs, with but one station. Our ill- 
formation as t o  the status of the Political Officer is based 
upon a report made by Col. Chapman, R. A., but is sup- 
plernented by the views of Lieut. Maltin, R. E., who 
scrved with thc same column. R e  says: 
" Thc old English respect for law and constitutcd civil 
authority is olten carricd to extravagance, and notably in 
India, where the Roman inaxinl ' Inter  armcs silent leges,' 
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appears to have been clean forgotten. T h e  Politicals 
were by no mcalls silcnt, and the alnoullt of ltnowledge 
they possessed of border statistics was something marvel- 
lous. Dicl any step appear to the military scnsc advisable, 
there was a lnuch bcttcr, t l ~ o ~ g h  less colnprchensible, 
political reason why it should not be ~ ~ ~ ~ c ~ c r t a k c n .  The 
oracle has spolicn and the behest must be obeyccl. All 
enemy in sight who 1~ccamc'afterw:~rds hostile, must not 
be ltcpt at a distance; tllrougll political glasses they 
appear as ' cllildren of naturc,' while thc coulltry out of 
sight must not be cxplored, the susceptibilities of the sen- 
sitivc ' Tamlnizais ' having to be rcspectecl. That much 
valuable service was pcrforined by political officers therc 
can be no doubt, but  that thcy causcd great exasperation 
among soldiers cannot bc dcnied, and the cxamplc of the 
War of 1839-40 causes thcm to be looked upon as a very 
possiblc sourco of danger." 
A7tgZu-A fgLa7t O]cmtiu~~s.--The observations of a par- 
ticipant {+ in t11c last British camlmigu in Afgllanistan will 
be founcl of value in thc study of futurc operations in that 
country. Of the Afghan tactics 11c says : " Thc  enemy 
(generally spealiing, a. rncc of Highlanders) vastly preferred 
thc attacli, and usually obtaincd Ihc advantage of supcrior 
numbers bcforc risliing an attacli ; '::' {; bcing able 
to dispensc (for the time) wit11 lincs of com~nunication and 
baggage and commissariat columns, t11c Afghan tribcs 
wore oftcn ablc to  rnisc 1:ugc g:~thcrings on chosen 
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groul~d.  They  could always attaclc us ;  we werc rarely 
(except whcn they chose) t o  find thein at hornc." 
This observer says t he  regular troops of the Arncer were 
llot so forinidable as t he  tribal gatherings. Thc prcsence 
of a tactically i~nrnovable artillery hinders the actioil of 
a11 Asiatic army. Tllc mounted ~ n c n  are usually the first 
to  leave whell thc fight is going against their side in a 
general engagement. Ollc of the best spccinle~ls of thcir 
tactics was at Ahmed-Rlleyl, on the Ghazni-Kandahar 
road, whcn the British divisioll was one hundred miles 
from any support. T h e  Afghans assembled a force out- 
nuinbering the British tcn to one. T h e  attaclc was inadc 
in a scries of rushes, twice dispersing the British cavalry, 
and oncc driving back thc infantry. Exposed to  a con- 
stant fire of ficld guns, the Afghans stood their ground, 
nlthough poorly armed wit11 n varicty of obsolete weapons 
-from an Enfield to a handjar or a stick. Trouble may 
always bc expected froin the night attacks of certain 
tribes like the Alizais and Waziris. 
Thc  English infantry formatioil was an objectionably 
close one, and Licut. Martin says that  the bayonets and 
rifle-barrels of thc iront ranlc were sometimes struck and 
jammed by 6zdZets f r o 7 r s  the rtTnr rnltk. The action of 
the English cavalry, as at Ahmcd-Khcyl, was suicidal in 
rcceivitlg the  enemy's cl~asge-pr.actically a t  a halt. Oc- 
casionally shelter trenches were used, but disapprovcd. 
In the ICurain valley column, under Gencral Roberts, 
the cavalry (principally native, with one rcgular squadron 
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and a battery of horse artillery) formed a brigaclc, but  was 
never used indcpendcntly, nor was it instructccl (altl~ougl~ 
well equipped) for mocleril cavalry work. The  opposition 
to dismounted cavalry duty is still so grcat, in the British 
army, tllat tllc mouilted arm is paralyzed for effective 
service. 
Very little was done by tlle horse artillery with the 
I<uram column. In thc case of tlle field artilleiy it was 
found necessary 011 two occasioils t o  transfer the  ammuili- 
tion boxes fro111 the bullocl<-carts t o  the baclrs of elephants, 
011 account of the steepness of the hills. The  mountain 
artillery (native) was tlle most serviceable ; a Gatling bat- 
tery, paclted on ponics, and in charge of n detachment of 
Highlanders, was nevcr uscd howcvcr. 
The  armament of tllc infantry ii~cluclocl both Martini 
and Snidcr rifles, recluiring two Kil~cls of ammunition, but, 
as the  scrvicc by pacli-mules was ainplc, no confusion cn- 
sued, althougl~ Licut. Martin says : " In one case I heard 
a wl~isper that LL 1,cgirncntal reserve of ammunition was 
found to be Bl~t7zk cnrts~idgcs, but this must be a heavy 
jolrc." I i l t rcnc l~i~~g tools were carricd on camels. A 
mixture of military aild civil-enginccr administratio11 and 
operation is lncntioncd :IS unsatisfactory in results. There 
was great difficulty in gcttiilg tools and inaterials a t  the 
opcning of thc campaign-particularly thosc rcquircd for 
road and bridgc work, althougll a railroad within two hun- 
drccl milcs had a largc stoclr on hancl. 
The  art of camping aild rough fortification was well 
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practised. The best defended camp was surrounded by 
bus11 abatis and flanlted by half-moon sul~gus of bouIder- 
stone work, which held the sentries. The most approved 
permanent camps or " posts " were mud scrub flanlred by 
bastions at  the alternate angles and overlooltiilg a yard or 
"kraal." These were established about ten miles apart, 
to protect communications, and furnished frequent patrols. 
During the latter part of the campaign these outposts 
were manned by the native contingents of the Punjab 
who vol.unteered. 
The rapid march of General Roberts from Kabul to  
Kandahar in August, 1880, and the final dispersion of the  
forces of Ayoub Ichan, illustrated British operations in Af- 
ghanistan under the most favorable circurnstanccs. The  
forces includecl 2,800 European and 7,000 Indian troops ; 
no wheeled artilIeiy was talcen ; one regiment of native iA- 
fantry, trained to practical engineering work, did the work 
of sappers and miners ; for the  trailsportation of sick and 
wounded 2,000 doolie-bearci-s, 2% ponies, and 43 donkeys ; 
for transport of supplies a paclr-train of 1,589 yabas, 4,s 10 
mules, 1,224 Indian ponies, 912 donkeys-a total of 
10,148 troops, 8,143 native followers, and I 1,224 animals, 
including cavalry horses ; 30 days' rations, of certain 
things, and dependence on thc  country for fresh meat and 
forage. The absence of timbcr on this route rendered i t  
difficult to obtain fuel except by burning the roofs of the  
villages and digging up tlle roots of " Southern-wood " 
for this purpose. The manner of covering the movement 
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rested with the cavalry commander. Usually t he  front 
was covcred by two rcgirncnts, one regiment on each 
flank, at a mile from the column, detaching one or more 
troops as rear-guard ; once movemerlt had commenced, the 
animals, moving at different gaits were chcclred as little as 
possible. With such a number of non-combatants the 
column was strung out for six or seven miles, and the 
rear-guard lcavirlg onc camp a t  7 A.M. rarely reached the  
next-fiftccn to twenty miles distant-before sundown. 
Xoutes.--For operations in Afghanistan the general 
British basc is the frontier from I<urrachce to Peshawur. 
These points are conilected by a railway running east of 
the Indus, which forms a natural boundary to  t he  Indiap 
frontier, supplemented by a line of posts whicl~ are from 
north to  south as follows: Jumrud, Baru, Mackeson, 
Michni, Shub I<adar, Abazai, and I<ohut ; also by fortified 
posts connected by military roads,--Thull, Bunnoo, and 
Doaba. 
From the Indus valley into the interior of Afghanistan 
there are only four lines of coinmunicatioil which can be 
called military roads : first, from Pcshnwz~r through the 
Ichaiber Pass to Knbzd; second, froin ThzdZ, over the 
Pciwar and Slluturgurdan passes t o  Knbldl; third, from 
Dern IsnzniZ Khnfz through the Gulcir Surwandi and 
Sargo passes to Ghnani; fourth, by  Qzlettn to I<andal~ar 
and thence to  f i ~ n t ,  or by Gl~azni t o  Iinbzd. Bcsidcs 
these there are inany stccp, difficult, mulc traclcs ovcr the 
bleak, barren, Sulirnani range, which on its castern side 
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is very precipitous and impassable for any large body of 1 
troops. 
I 
The Peshawur-Icabul road, I 70 miles long, was in 1880 
improved and put in good order. Frorn Peshawur the 
road gradually rises, and after 7 miles reaches Jumrud 
(1,650 fect elevation), and 44 miles further west passes 
through the great Ichaiber Pass. This pass, 31 miles 
long. can, however, be turned by going to  the north 
through the Absuna and Tartars passes ; they are not 
i practicable for wheels, and the first part of the road along 
thc Kabul Rivcr is very difficult and narrow, being closed 
! 
in by precipitous cliffs. 
As iar as Fort Ali Musjid the Ichaiber is a narrow de- 
file between perpendicular slate rocks 1,460 feet high ; be- 
yond that fort the road becomes stiIl morc difficult, and ! 
in some of the narrowest parts, aIong the roclcy beds of 
1 
I 
torrents, it is not inore than 56 feet wide. Five miles I 
furthcr it passes through the valley of LaIabeg I+ miles 
I 
wide by 6 miles long, and then after rising for four miles it 
]-caches the top of the Pass, which froin both sides offers 
very strong strategical positions., From thence it de- 
scends for 2+ miles to the village of Landi I<hana (2,463 
feet), which li@s in a gorge about a quarter of a mile 
wide ; then on to Daklca (altitude 1,979 feet). This pass, 
IOO to 225 feet wide and 60 feet long, is shut in by  steep 
but not high slopes, overgrown with bushes. 
On the eleven miles' march from Daltlta to I-Iazarnao, the 
Khurd Khaiber is passed, a decp ravine about onc mile 
large body of 
nL was in 1850 
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hut in by steep 
0s. 
Lo Hazarnao, the 
about one mile 
long, and in many places so narrow that two horsemen 
cannot pass each othcr. Hazarnao is wcll cultivated, and 1 
rich in fodder; 1 5  inilcs farther is Chardeh (1,800 feet i 
altitude), from which t l ~ c  road passcs through a wcll-culti- 11 
vated country, and on through the desert of Surlth Den- 
ltor (1,892 feet altitude), which is over 8& miles from Jela- 
labad. From this city (elsewhere described) onward as far 
as Gundarnuclt the route prcsents no great difficulties ; it 
passes through orcl~arcls, vineyards, and cornfields t o  the 
Surlthab River ; but beyond this thrcc spurs of the Safed li 
ICoh range, running in a northeastern direction, have t o  !I 
be surmounted. 
Between Jelalabad " and Kabul two roads can be 
followed: the first crosses the range over the ICarkacha 
Pass (7,925 fcet alt.) a t  the right of which is Assin 
Kilo, tl~cncc througl~ t l ~ c  ICotul defile, and ascellding the 
Ichurd 1cabul-f (7,397 fcct alt.) to the north rcaches 
the high plateau on which Icabul is situated ; the other 
leads over the short but dangerous Jagdallalt Pass to 
Jagdallalt, froin which thcrc are three roads to  Kabul- 
t l ~ c  northernmost over the Ichinar and the third over the 
Sokhta passes; all these, more difficult than the IChaiber, 
arc impassable during the winter. I t  was here, as already I 
rclatcd, that the greater part of Elphinstone's command, I 
in 1842, perished. T11cre is a dearth of fucl and supplics 
"Tllc hcal at Jclalabad froin the end o l  April is trcmcncloas-105' to 
110" in thc sllncle. 
.( 'The ICl~urd 1Cal)ul Pass is abonl hvc milcs long, with an i~npcluous 
mountain torrent which the road (1842) crosscd twcniy-eight ti~ncs. 
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b y  this line of communication. Thc  seconcl, or Thull- 
J(uram-ICabul, rAute, was taken by Gcneral Roberts in 
1878-9. I t  extends from Thull, one of the frontier posts I 
already mentioned, some forty miles into the ICuram 
valley, a i d  then inclining towards the  west leads t o  the 
~ C L I S ~ ~  fort (Mohammeclr Azim's), a wallcd quadrangular 
fortrcss with flanking towers at an elevation of 6,000 feet. 
The  Icuram valley is, up to this point, wcll cultivated and 
productive ; wood, water, 2nd forage abound. Winter 
only lasts with any severity for six weeks, and the Spring 
and Autumn are delightful. 
A short distance above the fort coinmenccs the ascent 
toward the Peiwar Pass (8,ooo feet alt.), twenty-four 
miles distant. The road, thiclcly bordcred with cedar and 
pine trees, is covered with bouldcrs and is very difficult, 
and from the village of Peiwar-one of inany en route, of 
the  usual Afghan fortified type-it lcads through a wind- 
ing defile to the top of the pass. I lere  the road is confined 
by perpendicular chalk rocks, the summits of which are 
covered with scrub timber and a luxurious growth .of 
laurel. On the farther side of the pass the road ascends 
to  the height of the Hazardaralht, (which is covered with 
snow in the winter), and then climbs to  the Shuturgusdan 
Pass ( I  1,375 fcet alt.), reaching a plateau on which the  
snow lies for six months of the yeas ; thence it  descends 
into the fertile Logar valley and reachcs Akton I~ l i e l ,  \ 
which is only fifty-one miles from Kabul. T h e  total 
length of this route is about 175 miles. 
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T11e third, or Dera-Ismail-I<han-Sargo-Ghazni, route 
passes through a region less frequented than those men- 
tionecl, and is not thought sufficiently difficult for 
detailed description. Passing due west, through seventy 
l e a d s  to tlic 
of mountain gorges destitute of supplies or forage, . 
i t  debouches, through the Gomal Pass, into a more 
prornisiilg country, in which forage may be obtained. A t  
~l t ivaf:  ed and this point it branches to  Ghazni, Kandahar, and Pishin 
nd. Willter 
respectively. A road exists from Mooltan, crossing the 
lndus at Dera-Ghazi-Khan, Mithunltot, Rajanpur, Rojan, 
i Lalgoshi, Daclur to Quetta, and was utilized by General 
:s t h e  ascent Biddulph, irom whose account of his march from the 
twenty-four I Indus to the Helmund, in 1879, is gleaned the following. 
th cedar and i i The inain point of concentratioi~ for the British forces, 
cry difficult, j 
either from India or from England via Kurrachee is thus 
z Y O ,  of j 
i ~ninutely described. )ugh a w i n d .  , 
"The  wcstcril frontier of India is, for a length of 
600 miles, bounded by Biluchistan and territories in- 
~f wh ich  are habited b y  Bilucll tribes, and for 300 miles Biluch 
country intervenes between our border and Afghanistan. 
.oacZ ascends The plains of the Punjab aild Sind run along the boundary 
of Biluchistan, and at  a distance of from 25 to 50 miles the 
Indus pursues a course, as far down as Mithunlcot, from 
.I w h i c h  the 
north to south, and then winds south-west through a 
countiy similar t o  that of Egypt. A belt of cultivation 
and beyond that the clesert ++ *E ++ this line of hills (the 
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an elevatioll of I 1,000 feet a t  thc  Tukl-i-Sulirnan, and of 
7,400 ncar Fort Munro (opposite Dcra-Ghazi-Khan), grad- 
ually dimitlislles in llcight and dwitldlcs away till it is lost 
in the plains ncar Icusmore, at a point 12 inilcs from the 
Illdns. The strip of low-land country on the  west bank 
of the  I i~dus up to  the foot of the hills is called the 
Derajat. I t  is cut up and brokcil by torrcnts, the beds of 
wl~icll are generally dry wastcs, and the country is, cxcept 
at a few places where permanent water is found, altogether 
sterile ancl hot. If we vicw the  physical aspect looking 
llorth and nortll-west from Jacobabad, we notice a wide 
bay of plains extending betwcen the brolcen spur of the 
Sulimani, and a second range of hills having a direction 
parallel to the outer range. This plain is called the 
I<achi, extencls in an even surface for 1 5 0  milcs from the 
Indus at Sukltur, and is bouncled on the north by succes- 
sive spurs lying between the two grcat ranges. The 
Icachi, thus boundcd by barren hills on all sides bu t  the 
south, is one of the hottest rcgioils in the world. Except 
where subject to i~lulldations or withia I-cach of irrigation 
it is completely sterile-a hard clay surface called P&t,- 
and this kind of countrjr cxtcnds around to the east of the 
spur of the Su l i~na~ l  into the  Dcrajat country. Subject to  
terrific heats ancl to  a ficrccly hot  pcstilcntial ~vind, tlie 
Icachi is at times fatal cvcn to  the  nativcs." 
The  range of inouiltains bouncling thc Icachi t o  the 
westward is a colltilluous wall wit11 impcrccptible breaks 
only, and it bears the local names of Ginclari, Takari, and 
ulimnn, alld 
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Kirthar. Through this uniform rampart there are t w o  
notable rents or defiles, viz. : tlle Mzdfa opening opposite 
Gundana, leading to Icelat ; and the Bofalz entering ncal- 
Dadur, leading to Quctta, Kandahar, and Herat. T h e  
Bolan is an abrupt defile-a rent in the range,-the bot- 
tom filled with the pebbly bed of a inountaiil torrent. 
This steep ramp forms for sixty iniles the road from 
Dadur, elevation 750 fcet, to  the Dasht-i-Bedowlat, eleva- 
tion 6,225 feet. This inhospitable plateau and the upper 
portion of the Bolan are subject to  the most piercingly 
cold winds and temperature; and the sudden change 
from the heat of the Icachi to  thc cold above is most 
trying to the strongest constitutions. Notwithstanding 
the difficulties of the road, the absencc of supplics and 
fuel, and thc hostile character of thc prcdatory tribes. 
around, this route has bcen always most in favor as t l ~ e  
great commercial and military cominunication from Persia, 
Central Asia, and Khorassan to  India. 
The causes which led to the establishment of a British 
garrison at Quetta are not unlilte those which are urged 
as good Russian reasons for the occupation of territory 
in certain parts of Central Asia. Bricfly stated, i t  scems 
that after the conquest of the Punjab, the proximity of 
certain disturbed portions of Biluchistan, and the annoy- 
ance suffered by various British illilitary expeditions, in  
1839-1874, from certain tribes of Biluchis-notably t he  
Maris and Bugtis,-made it desirable that morc decisive 
measures should be adopted. In 1876 a forcc of British 
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troops was marched to Kelat, and by  mutual agreement. 
the Khan a political agency ' was established at 
Quetta, ostensibly t o  protect an important coinmercia~ 
highway, but a t  the same time securing a military footing 
of great value. But the character of the lords of the soil 
--the Maris, for instance-has not changed for the better, 
and the temporary general Europeai~ occupation of the 
countrywould afford an opportunity t o  gratify their preda-. 
tory instincts, which these bandits would not hesitate to, 
utilize. The  Maris can put 2,000 Inell into the field and 
march roo miles to male  an attack. When they wish tb 
start upon a raid they collect their wise men together and 
tell the warriors where the cattle and the corn are. If the. 
reports of spies, sent forward, confirm this staterncnt, the. 
march is undertaken. They ride upon mares which m a l e  
no noise ; they travel only at night. They are the most 
excellent outpost troops in the world. Urhen they arrive 
at the scene of action a perfect watch is kept and informa-. 
tion by single messengers is secretly sent back. Every 
thing being ready a rush of horseinen talces place, the  vil- 
lages are surrounded, the cattle swept away, the women 
and children hardly used-fortunate if they escape 
with their lives. The  villagers have their fortlets tor 
retreat to, and, if they reach them, call pull the lad- 
i ders over after them and fire away from their towers.. Dadur is an insignificant town at the foot of the Bolan. 
I From here the Kandahar road leads for sixty miles 
I through the Pass-a gradual ascent; in winter there is 
I 
not a mouthful of food in the cntire length of thc defile. 
Quetta, compared with thc rcgion to the south, appears 
a very Garden of Eden. I t  is a small oasis, grcen and 
well watered. 
From Quetta to  Pisliin the road skirts thc southern 
border of a vast plain, interspersed with valleys, which 
extend across the eastern portion of Afghanistan toward 
the Russian dominion. A study of  thc Pishin country 
sllows that it is, on its northwesterll side supported on a 
limb of the Western Sulimani. This spur, which defines 
the west of the Barshorvalley, is spread out into thc  broad 
plateau of Toba, and is then produced as a continuous 
ridge, dividing Pishin froin thc plains of ICadani, under the 
name of IChoja Amran. Thc Barshor is a dcep bay of 
the plain, and there is an open valley within the  outer 
screen of hills. A road striltcs off here t o  the Ghilzai 
country and to  Ghazni. Though intersected by  some 
very low and unimportant hills and ridges, the Pishin 
plains and those of Shallltot may be loolted upon as one 
feature. W e  may imagine the Shall Valley the vestibule, 
the ICujlalt-Icaltur Vale the passagc, the Gayud Yara Plain 
an antechambcr, and Pishin proper the grcat snZZe. SLIT- 
rounded by mountains which givc forth an abundant sup- 
ply of water, the lands bordering on the hills are studded 
with villages, and there is much cultivation; there is a 
total absence of timber, and the cultivation of fruit-trees 
has becri neglected. Thc  Lora rivcrs cutting into the  
plain interferes somewhat with the  constructioil of roads. 
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The Plain of Pishin possesses exceptional advantages 
for the concentratioil and rendezvous of large bodies of 
troops, and has already been utilized for that  purpose by  
the  British. 
From the Ichoja Amran, looking toward Kandahar, the  
plains, several thousand feet below, are laid out lilte a sea, 
and the mountains run out into isolatccl promontories ; to 
the left the desert is secn lilte a turbulent tide about  to  
overflow the plains. 
The rivers on .the Quetta-Randahar route d o  not 
present much impediment ,to the passage of troops in  dry  
weather, but in flood $hey ':become serious obstacles and 
cannot be passed until (the ;waters retire. 
The ascent from the east through the IChojak Pass is 
easy, the descent on the west very precipitous. A thir- 
teen-foot cart road was made, over the entire lcngth of 
twenty miles, by  General Bicldulph in 1878-9, by which 1 
~ 
the first wheeled vehicles, which ever reached IChorassan 1 
from India, passed. 
From ICandahar (elsewhere described)-which is consid- 
ered by General I-Iamley and other authorities, one of the 
most important strategic points in any scheme of pcrma- 
nent defence for India-divergc two maill roads: o n e  a 
continuation of the Quetta-Herat route bearing N, W., 
and one running N. E. to Icabul. 
Gen. Biddulph says: " T h e  position of ICandal~a~ ncar 
t o  the slopes of the range to the westward of t h e  city 
,renders it impossible to construct worlcs close a t  hatld 
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to cover thc  road from Herat. The  high ridgc and outly- 
ing hills dividing I<andahar and its suburbs from thc 
Argandab valley completely command all the level 
ground between the city and the pass. Beyond the 
gap a group of detached momltains extends, ovcrloolting 
the  approaches, and follows the left bank of the Argandab 
as far down as Panjwai, fifteen milcs distant. Positions 
for defensive worlts must be sought, therefore, in front 
of that place on the right bailk of the river. T o  the N. 
E. of ICandahar thc  open plain affords situations for 
forts, well removed from the hills, at a short distance, 
and a t  Rlthund Ziarut, thirty miles on the road to Ghazni, 
there is a gorge which would, if held, add to security 
on that quarter." 
T h e  country between ICandahar and the I-Ielmund has 
the  same general characteristics-plains and mountain 
spurs alternately,-and while generally fit for grazing is, 
except in a few spots, unfit for cultivation. 
According t o  the eminent authority just quoted, the 
great natural strategic feature of this route is the ele- 
vated position of A t t a  Icarez, thirty-one miIes from ICan- 
dahar, H e  says: "On the whole road this is the 
narrowest gateway,, and this remarltable feature and the 
concentratioil of roads* here, give to Atta Icarez a strategic 
*The roads which meet at Atta 1Carez are: the great IIerat higllway 
passing tl~rough IColccran and crossing the Argandab opposite Sinjari, whence 
i t  lies along the open plain all the way to Atta Icarer ; the road which 
crosses the Argandal, at Panjwai; and the road from Taktipul towards 
importance unequalled by any other spot betweell India 
and Central Asia." 
General Biddulph examined this position carefully in 
1879, aild discovered a site for a work which would com- 
mand the valley of the Argandab and swcep the 
elevated open plain toward the west and nortl~wcst. 
Abbaza is a village at the  crossing of the I-Icrat road 
over the Helmund, forty-six miles west of A t t a  Icarez. 
011 the west balllc lies the ancient castle of Girishk. The 
country between the Argaildab and the I-Ielmuncl is roll- 
ing and inclining gradually from the  hills toward the junc- 
tion of these rivers. The  plateau opposite Girishk is 175 I 
feet above the river, which i t  commands. 
The  Helmund has already beell described. There are 
numerous fords, but, at certain times, bridges would be 
required for military purposes. The  land in the vicinity I 
of the Helmund is vely fertile and searnecl with irrigating 
canals. 
From Girishk a road via Washir runs through the 
hills t o  Herat ; this is said to be cool, well supplied 
with water and grazing, and is a favorite military route. I I 
A road, parallel, to the soutl~, gocs tl~rough Fxrrah, be- I 
yond which both roads blend illto one main roacl t o  the j I 
" I<ey.ll Still another road, by Bost, Rudbar, and 1 
Lash, along the course of the  river, cxists. Although not ) I
so direct, it is an important route to Ilerat ; upon this I 
road stand the ruins of the ancient city of Bost in a won- 
derful state of preservation; here, as elsewhere in this 1 
i 
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region, the remains of fortifications testify to  t h e  former 
military importance of the spot. The citadel of Bost is 
built on the debris of extensive worlcs and rises 150 feet 
above the river. 
B~itish Ge~zcml~.--Perhaps the most prominent of mod- 
ern British commanders, next to Lord Wolseley-is the 
young and successful soldier, Lieutenant-General Sir 
Fredericlc Roberts, G. C. B., C. I. E., commanding the 
: Anglo-Indian Army of the Madras Presidency. H e  has 
I 
I already seen service in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and i has been appointed to  the coillmand of one of the princi- 
I 
i pal divisions of the British forces intended to  oppose the 
threatened advance of the Russians on I-Ierat. I t  was 
said of him by one of the most brilliant military leaders 
of the age,-Sltobeleff : " For General Roberts I have a 
great admiration. H e  seems to  me t o  possess all the 
qualities of a great general. That was a splendid marc11 
of his from Kabul t o  Icandahar. I think more highly of 
him than I do of Sir Garnet Wolseley, but there is this to 
be said of a l l  your generals, they have only fought against 
Asiatic and savage foes. They have not commanded an 
army against a European enemy, and we cannot tell, 
therefore, what they are rcally made of." 
The Commander-in-chief of the Army of India, General 
Sir Donald M. Stewart, G. C. B., C. I. B., to whom has 
been intrusted the conduct of the 13ritish forces in 
Afghanistan, is also a vely distinguished and experienced 
officer-probably more familiar with tlie nature of the 
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probable field of operations than any other in Her Majes- 
ty's Serviee. 
Lilce the United States, t he  great latent power of Eng- 
land is indisputable, and so long as superiority at  sea is 
maintained, time is given to render that latent power 
active. For the first year of the  coming struggle England 
must lean heavily upon her navy. Nearly all the regi- 
ments of infantry are below the average peace limit, and 
if filled up simultaneously to  a, inaximum war strength 
will include more than fifty per cent. of imperfectly 
trained men, and as the practice llas been to  fill up those 
corps ordered abroad with men transferred from other 
small regiments, it inay come to pass that so-called " reg- 
ular" regimcnts will consist largely of raw material. 
Colonel Trench of the British Army says "the organization 
of the regular cavalry is very defective," and especially 
cornplaiils of the maladministration we have just noted. 
Demands for cavalry for the S~uclan~were  met by a heavy 
drain on the already depleted strength of regiments in 
England. The Fifth Dragoon Guards, which stood next 
dred horses and onc hundred men. Colonel Trench says 
that the reserve cavalry have no training, and that there 
is no reserve of horses. I t  is doubtful if more than 
seventy per cent. of the enlisted strcngtl~ and fifty per 
cent. of the horses, on paper, could be pu t  in the  field 
now. 
Allusion has already been made to  the notorious wealr- 
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ness of the British transport system." If this has, been 
the case i n  the numerous sinall wars in which her forces 
have been engaged for the last twenty-five years, what 
may be expected from the strain of a great international 
campaign. 
On the other hand, Great Britain can boast of an inex- 
llaustible capital, not alone of the revenues which have 
been accumulatillg cluriilg the  last quarter of a century, 
but  of patriotism, pllysical strength, courage, and endur- 
ance, peculiar t o  a race of conquerors. 
A 
4: Captain Gaisford, who cornr~>anded the ICllaiber Levies in the Afghan 
campaign, rccommcnded refo~rns in the system of transport and supply. 
1 - ~ e  advocated certain Alncrican methods, as wiild nncl water-mills to crus!~ 
and cleanse the pet~ificd and gravelled I)arley, often issued, and tocut up the 
infc~ior hay ; thc selection of tlansport employis who understand animals ; 
and mole care in tra~lsporti~lg iorses by sea. 
i 
IV. I 
THE RUSSIAN FORCES AND APPROACHES. 
A MERE glance at  the ponderous military machine with 
which Russia cnforces law and ordcr within hc r  vast 
domain, and by which she preserves and cxtends hc1- 
power, is all that we can give hcre. 
No army in thc world has probably undcrgonc, \vithin 
the  last thirty years, such a successioll of extcnsivc altcra- 
I tions in organization, in administrative arrangcmcnts, and 
in tactical regulations, as that of Russia. T l ~ c  Criincail 
W a r  surprised it during a period of transition. Fur ther  
~ h a n g e s  of importance were carried out after t h a t  war. 
Once more, in 1874, the  wholc military systcm was rc- 
modelled, while ever since the  Peacc of Szn Stcfano, 
radical reforms have beell in progress, and have beell prosc- 
cuted with such fcverish haste, that i t  is dificult for the  
observer t o  keep pace wit11 t h e ~ n . ' ~  
The  militaiy system of Russia is based upon t l ~ c  prin- 
ciples of universal liability to scrve aacl of territorial dis- 
tribution. This applies to the eiltirc lnalc population, with 
cel-tain exemptions or modifications on the  ground, ros- 
pectively, of age o r  education. Annually thcro is a " lot- 
drawing," in which all ovcr twenty, who 11:~vc not  ;~lready 
* Sir L. Graham (j%z~v~raZ Roj/nC U. S. It~stitntion). 
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drawn lots, must take part. Those who draw blanks are 
excused from service with the colors, but go into the last 
reserve, or " OpoltscheniC." 
Tlie ordinary term of service is fifteen years,-six with 
HES. thc colors and nine with the reserves ; a reduction is made 
for men serving a t  remote Asiatic posts ; the War Office 
:hine with 
may se~lcl soldiers into the reserve before the end of thcir 
her vast terms. Reduction is also made, from eleven to thirteetl 
:ends her years and a hall, for various degrees of educatioilal acquire- 
ment. Exemptions are also made for family reasons and 
le, within on account of peculiar occupation or profession. Indi- 
:ve alters. viduals who persoilally manage their estates or direct 
lents, and their ow11 commercial affairs (with the exceptioil of venders 
: Crimean 1 
of strong liquors) may have their entry into service 
Further ;I postponed two years. Men are permitted to  volunteer 
that war. 1 
s a t  scventeen (with consent of parents or guardians); all 
1 was re- 1 volunteers serve iliile years in the rescrve; those joining Stefano, !l 4 the Guards or cav'alry must maintain thenlselves a t  their :en prose. 
+ own expense. T h e  total contingent demanded for army 11t for the I 4 a n d  navy in ISSO was 235,000, and 231,.961 were enrolled ; 
i 
'I of this deficit of 3,039, the greater number, 3,000, were 
the prin- Jews. 
torial dis. Org-a?zizatio~z.-The Emperor is the Coinmander-in- 
tion, with Chief, who issues orders through the War Ministry, whose 
mnd, res- head is responsiblc for the gcneral efficiency of the Army. 
is a " lot: There is also the  " Imperial Head-quarters," under a 
~t already general officer who, in the absence of the War Minister, 
talccs the Emperor's orders and sees to their execution. 
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T h e  War  Council, presided over by the W a r  Minister, 
superviscs all financial matters in connection wit11 the army. 
There are also a Iligll Court of Appeals, and the I-Iead- 
quarters Staff, who supervise tlle execution of all military 
duties. Commissariat, artillcry, engineer, medical, mili- 
tary education, Cossack, and judgc-advocate departments 
complete the list of bureaus. 
T h e  military forces are arrangcd into nineteen army 
corps : five coniprise three divisioils of inlantry ;. one, two 
divisions of cavalry; t h e  remainder, two divisions of 
cavalry and onc of infantry ; with a duc proportion of 
light artillery and engineers t he  war strcngth of an  army 
corps is 42,303 combatants, 10,755 horses, and 108 guns. 
When war is declared an  army is formed of two or more 
corps. Thc  gencral cominanding exercises supreme colt- 
trol, civil and military, if the force cnters the enemy's 
country. I-Iis staff are detailed much as usual at a n  
American army head-quarters in tlie field. 
Thcre are in thc active army-Infn~zt~y : 768 battalions 
(192 regiments, 48 divisions), 54 batt. riflemen. Cnvnlry: 
56 regular regimcnts (4 cuirassiers, 2 uhlans, 2 hussars, 48 
dragoons); 29 regt. Cossaclts, divided into 20 divisions, 
ltept in time of peace a t  768 mcll (864 wit11 sub-olficcrs) 
per regiment. Artillcry .* 5 I brigades, or 303 batteries of 
8 guns each ; 30 horse-batteries of 6 guns cach ; bcsidcs 
I4 batteries wit11 Cossaclc divisions. Fifly "parks " and 
20 sections of "parlcs" supply e a c l ~  infantry brigadc and 
cavaliy divisio~l with cartridges. 
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During 1884 the engineer corps was reorganized. 
Henceforward the peace establishment will cotlsist of seven- 
teen battalions of sappers; eight battalions of pontollicrs; \ 
sixteen field-telegraph companies, each of whicI1 is 
mounted, so as to maintain tclegraphic communicatiotl for 
forty miles, a i ~ d  havc two stations ; six engineering 
or trains, each ten sections, carrying each sufficient tools 
and material for an infatltry division; four battalions of 
military railway engineers; four mine companies ; two 
siege trains, and one telegraph instruction company. The 
whole is divided into six brigades, and provisions are 
taken for training recruits and supplying the losses during 
war. The fortress troops, for the dcfencc of fortresses, 
consist of forty-three battalions of twelve hundred men 
each in time of war, and nine compznies of three hundred 
men each. The  depot troops, for garrison service, con- 
sist of thirteen battalions and three hundred detach- 
ments. 
T h e  reserve troops supply 204 battalioils of infantry, 
56 squadrons of cavalry, 57 batteries of artillery, and  34 
companies of sappers. If mobilized, they are intended to 
supply 544 battalions, 56 squadrons, 1 4 .  batteries, and 34 
companies of engineers. The  second reserve, o r  (( Zapas," 
consists of " cadres " for instruction, organized in time of 
war. 
T h e  training of the Russian infantry comprises tha t  of 
skirmishing as of most importance ; thc whistle is used to 
call attention ; the touch is looser in the ranks than for- t 
Berdan breech-loader is the infantry a r m ;  sergcant- 
majors wear officers' swords, and togetlzer with musicians 
carry revolvers. 
R great stimulus has bcen given to rifle practice in the 
Russian army, with fair results, but complaint is made of 
want of good instructors. T h e  dress and equipment of 
the infantry is noted for an absence of ornament, and 
lloolts arc substituted for buttons. Every thing has 
been made subordinate to  comfort: and convenience, 
Woolleil or linen bandages are worn instead of socl~s. 
The  entire outfit of the soldier weighs about fifty pounds. 
The  Guai-ds, alone, are yet permitted to wear their old 
uniform with buttons. The  arms of the Turlrestan troops 
are mixed Berdan and Bogda11 rifles. The field clothing 
is generally linen blouse wit11 cloth shoulder-straps, 
chamois-leather trousers, dyed red, and a white kCpi. 
Officers wear the same trousers in the field. Cossaclrs 
wear gray shirts of camel's hair. 
The  artillery is divided into field artillery and horse 
artillery, of which the strength is given elsewhere. T11e 
horse batteries have the steel four-pound gun. 
Col. Lurnley, of the  British arAy, says : I n  Russia it 
is believed that the field artillery is equal to  that of any 
other Power, and the horse artillery superior." Lieut. 
this opinion. 
* A Britisli officer, who has had good opportunities, says the infantry drill 
is sccond to none. 
I t  is not too much to say that, in any European conflict 
in tlze near future, the Russian cavalry will be conspicuous 
and extraordinarily effective. 111 a war with England, in -+ 
Asia, the use of large bodies of cavalry, organized, in- 
structed, and equipped after the American plan, must be- 
come the main feature. 
From the wonderful reforms instituted by Russia in her 
huge army of horsemen, wl~ ic l~  have put her before all 
other nations, not excepting Germany, we may expcct to 
hear of wonderful mobility, stunning blows at  the enemy's 
depots, and the appropriation of choice positions under 
his nose : of stubboril contests with the Anglo-Indian 
infantiy, the only weapoil a Bcrdan carbine; of communica- 
tions destroyed by high explosives : especially, of the 
laying waste smiling Afghan valleys, inexpedieilt to oc- 
cupy:-thcse are a few of the surprises to which we may be 
treated if Russia gets the chance. In this manner she is 
doubtless prepared to talte the initiative in hcr next war.* 
* The bold operations of General Gourlco in the Russo-Turkish war of 
1878, afford Lhe best illustration of the versatile qualities of the progressive 
military l~orsemun since the American war, 1861-5. A11 Austrian officer 
says: "The Russian cavalry reconnoitred boldly and continuously, and 
gave proof of an initiative veryremarlcable. Every one lcnows that Russian 
dragoons are merely foot soldiers mounted, and only half horsemen : how- 
ever, that it should conle to such a point as maltiog dragoons charge with 
the hayonel, such as took place July 16th near Twardista, seems strange. 
Cossaclcs and Hussars dismounted on the got11, formed slcirmisl~ing lines, 
coming and going under the fire of infantry, protecting their buttery, and 
conducting done an infantry fight against the enemy. At Eslci Zagra, 
July grst, Lhe dragoons did not leave the field until all their cartridges were 
exhausted. On the other hand, the oJertsive action, and Lhe spirit of enter- 
prise and dash, which are the proper qualifications of cavalry, were not 
wanting in Lhc Russians." 
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Tlic whole of tile rcgulnr cnv:~lry of the l i~ic  has bccli 
cotiverted in to  dmgootis artncd \vitl~ Ilcrdnii rifle ;~iid 
bayonet ; t he  Gunrcl rcgilncnts ~ i i l ~ s t  rldopt the  same 
change when orclered into the  ficld, and tlie Cossacks 
have becn dcprivctl of tlie Inncc (cscepting for tlie front 
rank) ; new ~ n u s k e t r y  rcguIations have llcc11 prescribccl. 
Great stress is noiv I:liJ ~ IPOI I  tile tr;~itiing of both Ilorses 
:~11cl men in tile direction of l o t ~ g  m:~rclics, and the  passage 
of obstacles. Forced m;lrches arc also madc to cover 
the greatest possible distn~lces in tlie sllortcst possible 
time.* 
Sivilnming \v:ls p1-actisec1 in  tlic IVarsam, O~lcssa,  and 
Moscow tlistricts, tllc horscs l~cing rcgul:l~.ly tilught nit11 
tlic aid of inflntcd bags ticcl under thcln. T h c  S~lprasl 
was crossctl by tlic entire 4 th  Cavalry I.)ivision s~rimlning. 
In ortlcr t o  ncquirc n tliol.ough 1i110~lctlg~ of piottecr 
duty, both tlic officers ancl non-comrnissioncd officers of 
c;~valry ;[re nttnclicd to tlie c n ~ i ~ l c c r  anlp for  :L sliort 
course of instruction. In one division n regular pioneer 
squa[lron has  bccu formc~l for telegraphic and hcliograpliic 
* Amoug o t l ~ c r  experi~nents are noted that of 7 oficcrs aorl I.+ lncn of t l ~ c  
Orcnl~urg Cossacks \vho in h'oren~bcr last in liatl \veatl~cr travelled 410 
rersts l~ctr rcen Niji Novporod nltrl hfoscnrr ill 5 days-a11ont 5 3  rl~ilcs 
n day;   hen covering 635 versts from hfoscuw to St. Peteraburg in 8 days- 
56 miles a tlny ; o n  arrival an inspector ruportcd horses fresh and rcatly for 
service ; the party was mentioned in orclcrs, and presented to the Czar. 
A month before, in snow and it~tensc old, 7 oficers nnd 7 me11 of t l ~ c  cav- 
alry school covered 370 versts in 4 days-60 miles n clay. It is asserted that 
the best Russian cnvnlry can trarcl 70 miles a day, continuonsly, without in- 
jury. General Gourko recently inspected two sotnias of Don Cossacks who 
had cleared 340 versts i n  3 days, o r  74 miles a clay. 
! ( !  duty. The mounted force, provided for in t he  Russian 
establishment, comprises twenty-one divisions of 3,503 
sabres and 1 2  guns cach, or  an aggregate of 73,563 mcn 
and 252 field guns. 
A feature of the Russian cavalry equipment is the  
pioneer outfit, consistilig of  tools for constructio~l or 
destruction, as they desire to  repair a bridge or destroy 
a railroad : this outfit for each squadron is carried on 
a pack-mule ; dynamite is carried in a cart with the am- 
mullition train. 
T h c  Cossack (except of the Caucasus) is armed with 
a long lance (front rank only), a sabre without guard, and 
I a Berdan rifle. Those of the Caucasus have in addition 1 
pistol and dagger, besides a ~zngashu or nativc whip. 1 
The uniform is blue, high boots, fur cap, cloak with cape. 
The snaffle-bit is universally uscd, even by tllc officcrs, 
although the average Russian troop-horse is noted for 
his hard mouth. 
In t he  mounted drill of the Cossaclcs there is a charge 
as skirmishers (or "foragers ") called the " lava,'' which is 
executed at a great pace and with wild yells of " I-Iourra ! " 
Lieut. Grierson, of thc British army, writes that  : " A 
big fine mail mountcd on a pony, with his body bcnt  
forward and looking very top-heavy, always a t  a gallop, 
l 
and waving his erlormous whip, the  Cossaclc presents an  
almost ludicrous appearance to one accustomed. to  our 
stately troopers. But this feeling is dashed with regret 
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Transport a d  Sz$pdy.-The Russian system of trans- 
port is in a very experimental and unsatisfactory state. 
I t  is the only army which provides regimentally for the 1 persa7z7zel and ~n.ntPrieZ of this department. I n  each regi- 
I 
I ment is a non-combatant company, in which all men re- 
quired for duty without arms are mustered. 
I All military vehicles required for the regiment are under 
, 
charge of this company. Thc  intention of the systcm 
1 
I now developing is to reduce the  quantity ol transporta- 
tion required." Besides the wagons and carts used for 
ordinary movements of troops, Russia will, in Afghanistan, 
I 
depend upon the  animals of the country for pack-trains I and saddle purposes. After the Cnmcl, of which large 
numbers exist in the  segion bordering Afghanistan on 
the north, the most important aid to  Russian military 
mobility is the reinarltable Kirghiz Harsc. The  accounts 
of the strength, speed, endurance, and agility of this little 
animal are almost incredible, -1- but they are officially in- 
dorsed in many instances. H e  is foui~d in Turkestan, and 
is more highly prized than any other breed. The  Kirgbiz 
horse is seldom more than fourteen hands, and, with the 
exception of its head, is fairly symmetrical ; the legs are 
exceptionaIly fine, and the hoofs well formed ancl hard as 
* I n  1878 the head-quarters baggage of the Grand Dulie Nicholas required 
five hundred vehicles and fifteen hundred horses to transport it. 
t 111 1869 a Russian detachment of five hundred men, mounted on Kirglliz 
Ilorses, wilh one gun and two ~.oclcet-stands, traversed in one month one thou- 
I sand miles in the Orenburg Steppe. and only lost three horses ; halE of Lhis 
march was in deep sand. I n  October, M. Nogalr (a Rnssian oflicer) left his 
detachment rn route, and rodc one horse into Irgiz, 166# miles in 34 11ours. 
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iron. I t  is seldom shod, and with bare feet traverses 
the roughcst country with the agility of a chamois, leap- 
ing across wide fissures on the rocks, climbing thc steepest 
heights, or picliing its way along mere sheep-tracks by the 
side of yawning prccipiccs, or covering hundreds of versts 
through heavy sand, with a heavier rider, day after day. 
I t s  gaits are a rapid and graceful walk of five and one half 
t o  six iniles an hour, and an amble-x at the maximum rate 
of a mile in two minutes. This animal crosses the most 
rapid streams not over three and one half fcet deep, lincd 
with slippery boulders, with ease. They are good weight 
carriers.? With a view of stimulating horse-breeding 
in Turkcstan, the governmeilt in 1851 offered prizes for 
speed.$ Icirghiz horses have been thoroughly tested in 
the Russian army. For modern cavalry and horse-artillery 
purposes they are unsurpassed. The average price is £6, 
but an ambler will bring LIZ. Great Britain is said t o  
possess z,8oo,ooo horses, while Russia, in the Kirghiz 
steppes alone, possesses 4,000,000 sadclle or quick-draught 
horses. 
The supply of the Russian army is carefully arranged 
under the central Intendance. The ration in the field was, 
in 1878, 14.3 ounces of meat, 14.9 blaclc bread, preserved 
vegetables.and tea, with an issue of brandy in the winter. 
*Moving both feet on a side allnost simultaneously. 
f The mounted messengers (pony express) over the steppes, use tllcse horses, 
ancl carry with them, over stages of 350 miles in 8 days, an equipment a n d  
supplies for man and horse of nearly 300 pounds. 
$ The greatest speed recorded (1853,) was rg,j miles (on a measured course} 
in 27 minutes and 30 seconds. 
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Immense trains follow each division, at intervals, forming 
consecutive mobile magazines oE food. A division pro- 
vision train call carry ten days' supply ior zjo,ooo men. 
Forage is now supplied for transport in compressed * 
caltes, oE which ZO,OOO,OOO were used by Russia in her last 
war. 
Clothing is furnished by the supply bureau of certain 
regions in which there are large government factories ; 
it is usual to  kccp on hand for an emergency 500,ooo sets 
of uniform clothing. 
Xoz~tcs.-I-Iaving devoted a share of our limited space 
to an account of the roads leading to  Herat from India,we 
may consider, briefly? certain approaches to Afghanistan 
or India from the northwest. This subject has been so 
clearly treated in a recent paper read before the Royal 
United Service Institution by Captain I-Ioldich, R. E.,who 
surveyed the region referred to, in 1880, that we quote 
liberally as follows : 
I n  improving our very imperfect acquaintance, both with the present mili- 
tary resources and position of Russia in Central Asia, and of the difficulties 
presented both geographically and by the national characteristics of the races 
that she would have to encounter in a n  advance south of the Oxns, a good 
deal has been already learned from the Afghans themselves. Among the 
turbulent tribes dwelling in and  around Kabul, whose chief and lceenest in- 
terest always lies in that wl~ich bears, more or less directly, on their chances 
of success in mere faction fights, which they seem to regard as the highest 
occupation in life, thc Russian factor in the general game must be a matter 
of coilstant discussion. Thus it may possibly arise from their individual 
* A compressed ration of forage was extensively used by the Rnssians in 
1878, weighing 3+ ponnds ; 5 days' supply could bc carried on the saclclle 
1 with ease. 
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interest in tl~eir ~ationnl positiol~ tllat there is no belter natural geograpl~er 
III the ~vorltl than tlic tlfgllan of the Iiabul district. Tllcrc is often an ex- 
actncss about llis mctllod of imparting infor~llation (sometimes a careful 
little map tlralvn o l~ t  wit11 a pointed sticlc on the ground) \v l~ ic l~  would strike 
o r ~ c  a'; altcgetl~er estraordinary, I)ut for the reflection that this one accoln- 
plisl~ment is probably the practical outcome of the education of half a life- 
time. 
Rnssia's bases of military operatiol~s towards India are two : one on the 
Caspian Sen at I<ras~~ovodak, and Cl~ikisl~liar, wit11 outposts at Chat aud 
ICizil Arvnt; and the ot l~er  on thu line of Ichiva, Bol;l~;~ra, Samarcnnd, and 
hlargillan, xvhic11 may roughly 11e said to represent the frontier l~eltl (together 
xvitli a large extent of boiuldary soutl~ of I<uldja) by the Army of Tasliliend. 
under Geiicral Iiaufman~i. Gilt betmccn this latter line and tile Oxus, 
Russia is undoobtedly :~lready tlie dominant Power. T h e  meye fact of 
Russia having already thorougl~ly explored all these regions, gives her tlie 
key to their future disposal. There is no doubt that in all nlatters relating 
to the acquirement of geographical l<nowledge, where it bears 011 possible 
military operations, Russian perceptions are of the keenest. Her  surveying 
energies appear to be always concentmted on that which yet lies beyond her 
reacl~, rather Lhan in . the  completion of good maps to aid in the right 
go\*cr~~nlent of tllnt which llas already been acqnired. 
With what lies north of the Osus we can have very little to say or to do ; 
therefore it matters the less that in reality tve ltnow very little about it. The 
Oxus is nol: a fordable river, At IClioja Saleli, wl~ich is the furthest point 
supposed to have been reached by the Aral flotilla, it is about half a mile 
wide, with R slow cnrrent. At  Charjui it is about the same w i d ~ h ,  only 
rapid and deep. At Iiarlti it is said to be one thousand yards wide, and 
at ICilif perhaps a quarter of a mile. But a t  all these l~lnces there are ferries, 
and there woiild be ample means of crossing an army corps, if we Lake 
inlo account both tlie Aral flotilla and the native material, in the shape of 
large flat-botton~ecl boats, capable of containills one 11u11dred men each, used 
for ferrying purposes, of which there are said to be three hundred bet\veen 
IZilif and I-Iaznrasp. These boats are drawn across the river by horses 
swimming tvilli ropes attached to their manes. But ,under any circumstances 
it seems about as u~iIiliely that any British force mould oppose the passage 
of a Russ ia~~ army across the Oxus as that it would interfere with the Rus- 
sian occupalion of the trans-Oxus districts ; but once south of tlie Oxus, 
many new coaditions of opposition would come into play, arising principally 
from tlie very different national characteristics of the southern races to those 
farlher north. I t  would no longer be a matter of pushing an advance 
thro~igli sandy and waterless deserts, or over wild and rugged moootaills, 
dificnlties whicl~ in themselves have never yet retarded the aclvniicc of a 
determined gcneral, but there would be the reception that any Cl~ris- 
tian foe would almost certainly meet at  the h n ~ ~ d s  of n warli1;e ant1 powcrful 
people, who can unite with all the cohesioll of religious fn~~aticism, 1)ncked 
1111 by something like nlilitary orgartization and a perfcct acq~ininta~~cc with 
the strategic21 co~lditions of their country. Most probably there would be 
110 s e r i o ~ ~ s  local opposition to the occupntion by Russia of n line extending 
from 13alkh eastwards throng11 IChulm and I<unduz to Faizrrbad and Sar- 
liadcl, all of which places csn be rcacl~ed withoot great dificulty from the 
Oxus, and are con~lected by excellent Intern1 road cornrnunications. But 
the occupalio~~ of such a line could have but one possible ol)jcct, wl~ ic l~  
wo111d )e to conceal the actual line of furtllcr advance. Each of tllesc 
places may be said to dominate a pass to 111clia over thc IIindoo Rilsl~. Op- 
posite Sarliadd is the Bnroghil, lcading eitl~er to I<nsl~mir 01. to RIastuj 
and the ICuuar valley. Faizabnd commands the Nuksm Pass. I<li~~lnl 
loolcs southwards to Ghozi and the Parwan Pnss into Rol~istan, wl~ile from 
Balk11 two main routes diverge, onc to Bamian and Kabul, the other 
to  Blaimaua and Ilerat. 
I t  would be n grcat mistake to siippose that this short list clisposes of all 
the practicable passes over the I-Iiudoo I<iisl~. T11e mngc is a singularly well- 
deh~ecl  one tl~rongl~out its vast length ; bot it is not by nny lucans n rnuge of 
startling pcalcs and magnificent nltituclcs. I t  is rntl~cr a c11ain of vcry ele- 
vated flattish-toppecl hills, spreading down in long spnrs Lo t l ~ e  north and 
south, abouncli~~g in warm slieltercd vallcys a ~ ~ d  smiling corlicrs, afford- 
ing more or lcss pasture even in its highest parts, and traversed by countless 
paths. Many of these paths are followed by Iiuchis in tl~cir n11111tal ~uigrations 
southward, with their families and l~onseliolcl goocls piled u p  in picturesque 
heaps on their hardy camels, or with lnrgc herds of sheepand goats, in senrd~ 
of fresh pasturage. South of the Hiitdoo ICilsh we h1c1 inost of the eastern 
routes to our nortl~west frontier to converge in one point, vcry ncnr to Jel- 
alabad. There are certain routes existing bctween (lie Russian frontier a t ~ d  
India which pass altogether east of this poil~t. T l~crc  is one whicl~ can 
be followed from Tashkencl to ICashgar, and over the liarnkoram mngc, and 
another which runs by the Terek Pass to Snrl~add, and tl~cnce over the 
Baroghilinto Icashmir ; but  these routes have justly, and by allnost ~uiiversal 
consent, bccn set aside as i~lvolving dificultics of such obvious magnitude 
that i t  wpuld be  unreasonable to suppose that ally army under competent 
leadership could be  committed to them. The same might snrely be said of 
the route by tlie Nuksan Pass into the valley of Cl~itral and tlie Kunar, tvhich 
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joins the IChyber route not far from Jelalabad. Its length and intricacy 
alone, indepcnde~~tly of the intractable nature of the tribes which border it 
on cither side, and of the fact that: the Nulcsan Pass is only open for half the 
year, would surely place it beyond tile consideration of any gcncral who 
aspired to invade India after accomplishing the feat of carrying an army 
Lhrough it. West of ICafirstan across the Hindoo ICiish are, as we have saicl, 
passes innumerable, but only three wl~ich nced b e  regarded as practicable for 
an  advancing force, all the olhers more or less converging into these three. 
These are the KhLlc, the Iiaoshan (or Parwan, also called Sar Alang), and 
tlle Irak. T h e  Khblc leads from ICunduz via Ghori and the valley of 
the Indarab to the ]lead of the Panjshir valley. I ts  elevation is about thir- 
teen thousand fcet. I t  is described as an easy pass, probably practi- 
cable for wheeled artillery. T h e  Panjshiris are Tajalcs, and, like the,lCohis- 
tanis generally, are most bigoted Suniu Mohammedans. T h e  rich and 
highly cr~ltivatecl valley which they inl~abit. forms a grand highway 
into ICohistan and ICoh Dahman ; b ~ i t  nll this land of terraced vine- 
yarcls and orchards, watcrccl by snow-cold streams from the picturesque 
gorgcs nnd mountain passes of the EIindoo ICiish and Paghman monntains, 
-this very garden of Afghanistan, stretching away southwards to thc gates 
of Icabul, is peopled hy the same fierce and turbulent race who ]lave ever 
given the best f i ~ l ~ l i n g  men to  the armies of the Arnirs, and who have ren- 
dered the position of Kabul a s  the ruling capital of Afghanistan a matter of 
necessity ; with their instincts of religious hostility, i t  will probably be  
found that the Icohistani, ralller than the I-Iindoo Kfish, i s  thc rcal barrier 
belween the north and the south. T l ~ c  Sar Alanp or  Parwnn IJass lcads 
directly from ICunduz and Gllnri to Charilcar and Kabul. I t  is thc direct 
military rontc bctween Afghan Turlcestan and the seat of the Afghan 
Govcmment, but  is not much uscd for trade. I t  cannot be  much over 
eleven tliousand feet elevation, and it is  known to be an easy pass, though 
somewhat deslitule of fuel and forage. The next route of importance 1s 
that which leads from Balkh, via Bamian, to the Iralc Pass on the IIinrloo 
ICr~sh, and into the upper watercourse of the I-Ielmund River, and thence 
by the Unai over the Paghman range to ICabul. This is the great trade 
route from the marlcets of Turlcestan and Central Asia generally to Kabul 
and  India. The  Iral;, like the Parwan, is not nearly so high as has been 
generally assumed, while the Unai is a notoriously easy pass. This route is 
a t  present very much beticr known t o  the Russians, who have lately fre- 
quently traversed i t ,  than to ourselves. L ~ k e  the P nrwan ant1 the IihLlc, it 
is  lialde to be closed for three or  four montl~s of the year by snow. During 
the winter of 1879-80 they were open till late in December, and appear lo 
be again free from snow about thc middle of April. Between these main 
passes innu~nerable tracks follow the " durras," or lines of watercourse, over 
the ridges of the I-Iincloo Ilirsh and Pag-hman, wl~ich afford easy passage to 
men on foot and frequently also to " I<uchi " camels. These passes (so far 
as we can learn) could, any of them, be readily made available for mountain 
artillery wilh a very small expenditure of construclive labor and engineering 
slcill. I n  IZoh Dahman nearly every village of importance lying at the foot 
of  the eastern slopes of the Pagllman (such ns Beratse, Farza, Istalif, etc.) 
covers n practicable pass over the Paghnian, which has its co~lti~luation across 
the Shoreband valley and over the ridge of the Hindoo 1EEsh beyond it. 
But between the IChilc Pass and the Irak, the various routes across the 
EIindoo ICtsh, whether regarded as routes to India or to Kandahar, although 
they by no  means collverge on Kabul City, must necessarily pass withill 
striking distance of an  army occupying Kabul. Snch a force would have, 
first of all, thorougl~ly to secure its communication with the Oxus, and a 
strong position a t  Rabul itself. 
Having the official statement of a military engineer wit11 
reference to the Oxus-Hindu-Itoslz line, as a barrier or 
base or curtain, we may pass to the principal approach t o  
Herat from the northwest. 
There are four distinct lines by which Russia could 
move on Herat -: 
I. From the Caxyian base a trans-Caucasian army corps 
could move (only with the concurrence and alliance of 
Persia) by the Mashed route direct ; 
11. Or  it could move outside Persian territory, from 
Chi/2zkCzlinr by the Bendessen Pass to Asterabad, and 
would t h m  have to  pass through Persian territory t o  
Saralihs, or across the desert to Merv ; 
111. From the  Taxhhelzd--Boh/za~a base a route exists 
win Charjui, the Oxus, direct to Merv ; and there is 
1V. Also the well-known road by 13nZkk and Mamiana, 
direct to  Ilerat. 
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Routes 111. ancl IV. having just been discussed, let us 
look a t  Routcs I. and 11. 
Refcrriilg to the small outline map of the  trans-Cas- 
p i a ~  regiou, herewith, it will be  seen that troops could 
embai-lc from Odcssa in tlle flcct of rnercllailt steamers 
available, ancl, i f  not  inolestcd r 7 ~  7-0z~tp by llostile cruisers, 
would rcach Batam in from 2 to 3 days, thcilce by 
rail t o  Bakh in 24 hours, another 24 hours tlli-ougll the 
Caspian Sca to I<rasnovodsk, a transfcr in lighters to  the 
landing at Micl~aclovsl~, and tlle final rail tr;ulsportation 
to t h c  prcsent terminus of the traclc beyond Kizil Arvat  ; 
this, it is said, will soon reach Aslrabad, 310 miles from 
I-Ierat. The  Sccre ta~y of tllc Royal Asiatic Society, Mr. 
Cust, with his wife, passcd ovcr this routc in 1883, and 
testifies to the  ease and comfort of thc transit and t o  the 
great number of vessels engagccl in tlie oil trade, which 
are available for military purposes, both on the  Black and 
Caspian seas. H e  cstimatcs that  they could easily carry 
8,000 inen a t  a trip:% 
General I-Iainley says: " Wc may assume tha t  if on 
the railway (single track) t hc  vcry rnoclcratc numbcr of 12 
trains a day call run a t  the ratc of 12 miles an hour, the 
journey would occupy 40 hours. T h e  successivc detach- 
ments would arrive, thcn, easily in two days a t  Sai-alihs. 
* Mr. Cust says : " T l ~ e r e  a r e  Lhrce clnsscs of stealncrs on Lllc Cnspinn. 
I, the  Imperial wnr filcamcrs wit11 ~ v l l i c l ~  Wussin kccps dowrl piracy; 
2, the  stcnmcrs of tlic Cnncnsus ant1 Mcrcuiy C:umpany, very ~~xuucrous  and 
large vessels; 3, petrolcum vcsscls-each stcan~cr with n cnl~ncity of 500 
men." 
t Lecture before I<. U. S. Institution ( L o i ~ d o ~ ~ ) ,  IYR,I. 
THE RUSSIAN JORCES AND APPROACIIES. I 2  I 
A division inay be conveyed, complete, in 36 trains. Thus, 
in six days a division would be assemblcd at Saralths 
ready to move on the advanced guard. A n  army corps, 
with all its equipments and departments, would bc con- 
veyed in 165 trains in 17 days. I t  would then bc ZOO 
miles-another 17 days' march-from Herat. Thus, add- 
ing a day for the crossing of the Caspian, the army corps 
from Bald would rcach Herat in 35 days. Also the ad- 
vance of a corps from Turltestan upon Kabul is cvcn 
morc practicable than before." * 
The route from Tchikisl~liar via Asterabad (where it 
strikes the main Tcheran-Mashed-Herat road) would be at1 
important auxiliary t o  the railway line, 7,ia Asterabad. 
There is also a more direct caravan track running south 
of this across the I<horassan, from Asterabad (through 
Shahrud, Aliabad, Icl~af, Gurinn) to  Hcrat ; or, a t  
Shahrud, an excellcnt road running between thc two 
already described straight (via Sabzawar and Nishapar) t o  
Mashed. 
From Saralths to Merv the road is said to be good and 
fairly supplied with water. From Merv to  I-Ierat the 
well-worn expression " coach and four " has been used t o  
denote the excellcnt condition of the road.+' Yalatun 
* I n  his plan of invasion, Slcobeleff thought 50,oco men might uildertalte 
the enterprise witl~out fear of disaster. This forcc could be doubled from the 
Caucasus alone. 
t For Llle first IOO miles Lhc road follows the Mnrghab, which Abbott de- 
scribes as " a deep stream of very pure water, about 60 feet in breadth, a i d  
flouring in a channel mired to the dcplh cf 30 feet in the clay soil of the val- 
ley ; banlcs precipitous and friilged wit!l lamarislc and a few reeds." 
is described as fertile, well populatecl, and ~ul~healthy.* 
From Penjdch, whcrc the rivcr is so~netimes fordable, the 
road follows thc Khusk River, and, ascending the  Koh-i- 
Baber Pass, descends into the Herat valley, immediately 
beneath it. j- 
- 
*Band-i-Yalalun, or " barilt which throws the waters of the Mnrgl~ab  into 
thc canal of Yalatun." 
Belorc closing the chapter on the " Russian Forces," a brief clescrip- 
tion of the order of rnarcll custon~ary in Cenlral Asia may b e  proper. From 
a tr~lnslation by Major Clarltc, R. A,,  from ICotcnsko's " Turlcestan," it ap- 
pears that the horses accompanying Central Asian delachmcnts a r c  so  con- 
siderable that the lalter form, as it were, the cscort of the former. As an 
Asiatic enemy nearly always attacks from every sicde, the distribution of the 
troops, during the march, must b e  such that they may be able to repulse thc 
enemy no matter where he  may appear. Usually, a half sotnia (70 men) of 
cavalry marches in advance at  a distrnnce frorn $ to I$ miles, so a s  to  be in 
view of main body. Immediately in front of main body marches a detncli- 
ment of sappcrs and a company or  two 01 infantry ; then part of the artillcry ; 
then more inrantry ; the train ; bchind the train, ren~ninder of artillcry and 
inrantry ; as a rear guard, a sotnia of cavalry. Bivouacs in the Steppe are 
usually cliosea at  wells, anrl arc, in nlanyrespects, similar to  those customary 
in the Indian country in America. First, an outer line of carts o r  wagons ; 
the11 the troops ; and inside, all the mlirnals. The  accompanying diagram 
is frolh The Jozrnzal Royrr l  U~riied Scruice I?tsZifz6fiort (London). 
g . . . . . - . . . . I f  . r . . .  . h  
REVIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION. 
THE purpose of this volumc has been t o  give as much 
rcliabl~ il~forrnation upon the causc of tllc A~~glo-Russian 
dispute, t he  nature of tllc probable thcatre of operations 
in case of war, and of the armics of tllc I'owcrs co~m.x-ned, 
as could be  obtained and pl-intcd within a single fortnight. 
The  ricl~ness of the available material made this especially 
difficult, colnprising as i t  did the rccord of ~-cccnt cam- 
paigns in Afghanistan, as well as  the opiniol~s of those who, 
lilte VambCry, Vcniukofl, Rawlinson, Napier, and Cust, 
are authorities upon Asiatic topics. 
As these lines are written* thc civilizcd nations of the 
world await with bated brcath the next sccne upon the 
Afghan stage. 
Seldom when two gladiators, armcd and stripped, enter 
the arena does a doubt cxist as t o  their purpose. Yet 
such an exceptional uncertainty attends thc  prcscnce of 
Englancl and Russia on tllc bordcr of Afghanistan. 
A t  least 50,000 British soldiers arc drawn up in front of 
the Indus awaiting a signal from t l~c i r  Quecn. Ncarly 
twice that llumbcr of Russia11 troops arc rnasscd on 
* April 18, 1885. 
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or near the northwestern angle of the Ameer's coun- 
try.* 
I t  is ilnpossible to eliminate, altogether, from a study of 
the prescilt military situation, ccrtain political elements. 
I t  is apparcnt that the Russians near Herat stand prac- 
tically at "the forlcs of the road " ; it is a three-pronged 
fork-one branch runniilg cluc south to the sca and two 
branches clue east to India. Thc first-naincd requires but  
passing comment and oidy as it relates to Herat, planted 
on a routc which ca~lilot be controlled without i t s  posses- 
sion, for military and co~nmcrcial reasons well understood. 
As  already explained, thc routes to India, available t o  
Russia, enable hcr to move from her base on t h e  Merv- 
Herat line, both via Ballth and Kabul, for the purpose of 
flanking a British column moving from Quetta wcstward, 
or of raiding the rich valley of the Helmund ; from Tur- 
kestail above this route, a British force moviilg from ICa- 
bul to Ballth could also be threatened. By the  main 
Herat-I<andal~ar route an advance from the east could 
also be directly opposed; the  crossing of the I-Tclinund 
by  either army would probably be contcsted. 
In case of war, whether Anglo-Russian or Russo-Af- 
ghan, the first great battle would doubtless bc fought on 
t h e  ICandal~ar-Ghazni-Kabul ine. 
* Since the everiis noted in our first chnptcr (page 12) Lranspircd, nnoiher 
page has beell acldccl to Alglia~~isinn's blood-slni~ied record. AfLer conlront- 
irig encl~ ollicr on tlie IC1111slc River for some weeks a lnrge Russia11 forccunder 
Gcncrnl IComarolC attacked (March 30, 1885) Lhc Afghan troops a t  l'e~ijdeh, 
and alter a gnllnnt rcsisiancc on Ll~c par1 of tlie ualivc gnrrison it wns ui- 
tedy ronlccl and illc town occupietl l)y the victors. T l ~ c  Russian cas~lalLies 
were inconsicleral~le, but the Afglia~is lost ncnrly 1,000 mc11. 
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General 1-Iamley, the leading British military authority,* 
shows that this linc is, of all proposed, at once the most 
practicable ancl desirable line for the defence of India,-f 
l I e  says : " We should have a strong British governor in 
I<andahar, and a strong British force on the I--Ielmund 
and on the road to Kabul; the railway completed t o  
Kandahar, ancl, in case of a movement from Turlccstan 
against Icabul, a force on our side on its way to occupy 
that city, and new recruiting grounds open to us amid 
warlike populations. Surely therc can be no question as 
to which of thcse two sets of circumstances would give 
us most influence in Afghanistan, most power to oppose 
Russia and to  maintain conficleilce in India." $ 
The  same authority approves Sir Michael Biddulpll's 
recomlneilclatioil t o  utilize the strong natural positions 
* Lieu(.-Gcacrnl Sir. E. Hamley, I<. C. I3. 
, Three lines had Ocen considered : first, the line of the Eastern Sulimani, 
but tltis would leave the seaporl of 1Curracllee unprotected ; scconrl, from 
Pishin northeast lo ICabul. 
$ Gen. I-Iamley's remarlcs were made belorc the Royal Unitecl Service In- 
stitution (May 18, 1884), and, in the discussion which followed, Colonel 
Malleson said: " Recently in India some influentin1 natives said to m e  : 
'Russia will continue hcr advance ; she ~vill  not stop until she has gnincd the 
ferlile country of Herat, and then s l~e  will i t~ t r ig~~e  with the native princes 
bel~ind the Indus, and when you send a n  army to meet her, you will lind 
those native ~ r i l ~ c e s  ri ing in your rear.' I may fortify my own expericncc by 
what was told me by an Austrian gentlcnla~l who visited Indta about seven 
years ago. FIe paid a visit to the Mnl~oraja, of Cashmere, who said to l l i ~ n  :
' From you I hope to get tile in1111 ; you arc liot an Englisliman nor a Rus- 
sian. Tell me which is t l ~ c  stronger-the Engli\l~ power or the Russian ; 11e- 
cause it will lie neccssaiily my duty, ~f Russia should advance, and if I should 
lil~cl Rnssia stmtlgqr than England, to go for the defence of my throne on the 
side of Russia. ' " 
ncar Girishl; on the IIclmund. i l s  to ~~fcr]l;lni.,t;ln l l c  1~:s- 
tifics : " TVith a llower lilcc Russi:~ closirlg 011 i t ,  llolcliilg 
Pcrsia and Persian rcsourccs subject tcl its lv i l l ,  it is in 
vain to think that Alghatlistan will I>c lolls i ~ ~ ( l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d ~ n t  
cvcn in namc. IL is bctwccn liarnmcr ancl a~l~.iI,  o~.,  to 11sc 
a still inorc cxprussivc metaphor, betn,ccll tll,: clc\-il :{,ld 
the clccp sca. Ilouncl to us by no traditions, by 11o -;trorlg 
political influences such as might have been usctl to con- 
strain tllcm, thc Afgllan tribes, mcrcenclry nl~cl I,crficlio~~s 
to n proverb, an aggrcgatc of tribes-not a n:ltion,-n~ill 
losc no tiinc, whcn tlle moment occurs, in siding tvitll thc 
grcat power which promiscs most lavishly, or u~h ic l~  can 
lay strongest hold on thcn~." 
The  burning words with nrhich Gcncral IIamIcy closctl 
his lecturc onc yiar ago arc singularly true trl-clay, a n d  
form a fitting tcrmi~lation to this slictch : 
" I do not undervalue thc many influctices ~vh ic l~  will 
always opposc any policy cntniling expcnsc. I h t  if  tllc 
prescnt qucstion is fo~lncl to he - IIolv shall we gu;lrrl 
against a tcrrible inenace to our IntIinn IS~npil-u? any 
cost to be incurred can hardly he ad~nittetl :is a reason 
which ought to influence our course. Magnanimous trust- 
fulncss in the virtue and guilclessncss of rival states; dis- 
trust and denunciation of a11 who woulcl chill this inverted 
patriotism by words of warning; refusal of all lncnsurcs 
demanding expense which do not promise n pccunin~y 
return :--such is the kind of libcrality of sentirrlcnt which 
may ruin great nations. The qualities of the lamb may 
be vely excellctlt qualities, but they arc specially inap- 
plicable t o  dcalings with the wolf. Do those who s l ~ r i n k  
from expense thinlt that the presence of Russia i n  Afgllan- 
istan will be illexpcnsivc to  u s ?  Will the weakness 
which will be the  temptation and the opportunity of  R u s -  
sia be less costly than effectual defc~zce? When me en te r  
t he  councils of Europe t o  assert our most vital interests, 
shall wc spealc as we havc bee11 accustomccl to  spealr, 
when our free action is fettercd by thc ilnrniilcnt perpctua 
menace t o  India? Thcse are questions which, now p u t  
forth to this linlited aucliencc, will, perhaps, ~vithin t h e  
experience of most of us, be thunclered in the ears of t h e  
nation. England is just now not without serious per- 
plexities, but none are so fraught with possibilities of mis- 
chief as the storm which is now gathering on the Afghan 
frontier." 
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PROSE MASTERPIECES FROM MODERN ESSAY- 
ISTS : comprising single specimen essays from Irving, Leigh I-lunt, I.amb, 
D c  Quinccy, Landor, Syclney Smilli, Thaclieray, Emcrson, Arnoltl, hIorlcy, 
I-lelps, Icingslty, kusl;in, Lowell, Carlyle, Macaulay, ITroude, Frccninn. 
Gladslone, Newman, Lcslie Stcphen. Thcse essays l~avc  been selccled 
will1 rcferel~ce to  presenting specitnens of the methocl of tl~ouglit and tlic 
literary style of tltcir scveral writers, and also for the purpose of putting 
into convcnicnt sliapc for direct comparison the treatment givcn b y  siicli 
writers to similar subjects. 
THE Mv.rnnlL.1~~ or; LiTannTunn, by  
I rv i~~g.  
THE Woi:~.n nP noous, b y  I-lunt. 
~ ~ I L ' B I ( P I ! C T  SVMI~A.~HIGS, b y  Lamb. 
C o ~ v s n s ~ ~ l o ~ ,  b y  Uc Quince 
PETITION OF ~ 1 1 1 . :  TLIU<;S, by E k o r .  
131i~rr~1.r.s ~ 1 ;  ~',\I:LIAMENT, by La~ldor. 
FALLACIES, b y  Smith. 
NII. NISI H O N ~ B I  b Thaclccray. 
COMI~ENSATION k;y grnerson. 
SwlriTrN1~s.i ,\Nb LIC.II.I., b y  Arnold. 
Po~~ur.aa Crl~:runrc, by Morley. 
Axr orr LIVING W I ~ . B  OTIIEIIS, b y  Helps. 
Stephen. 
3 vols., 161110, bcvclled boards, with frontispieces on steel, gilt 
Lop, in  box, cach . . . . . . . . .  $I 25 
T h e  set in extra cloth, with cloth box . , , . . 4 50 
T h e  same in Russia-leather binding and casc, round corners, 
. . . . . . . . . . .  red edges 10 00 
, . I h e  same, large paper cclition, wiLh portraits, cloth extra, 
gilt top, rough edges . . . . . . . .  7 50 
THE ESSAYS OF ELIA. By Charles Lamb. " T h e  Temple 
Edilioq." I-Iandsomcly printed on  laid paper from new type, xvilli etchings 
by James D. Smillie, 1". S. Cliurcl~, R. Swain Gifford, and Charles A. Platt. 
. . . . . . . .  Octavo, cloth extra. Ahold $4 
The same, Islington Edition, 250 copies only, with proof iniprcssiou of 
etchings on s i z i i ~ ~ .  Quarto, nz6szlcred, printed upon pure linen paper ; cloll~, 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  uucnt $10 00 
AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS ; A MANUAL OF SUG- 
GESTIONS FOR BEGINNERS IN LITERATURE : compti.s- 
ing a clescription of publishing metliods and anangcments, directions for thc 
preparation of I I S S .  for the press, cxp1an;itioiis of the details of l,oc~lc-manu- 
fncturing, with in.;tructions for proof-reading, and specimens of typcrgml~l~y, 
tlie text of the United States Copyright Law and information co~rccrni~lg 
International Copyrights, togctlter will1 general Iiints for nutliors. Occn~.o, 
clothextra . . . . . . . . . . .  $1  vo 
' 'F~ll l  of vnll~able lliformntion for aulllors nnrl wrltcrs. * * * A mosl instructi\.c 
* * * nnd cxccllent mnnua1,"-//at$r?-'r A/orrt /r l j l  (Easy Chair). 
G. P. P U T N A M ' S  S O N S ,  P U B L I S H E R S ,  
NEW YORK AND LONDON. 



